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ABSTRACT 
  The modern death penalty is not just concentrating in a handful of 
practicing states; it is disappearing in all but a few capitally active 
localities. Capital-punishment concentration, however, still surfaces 
more as the subject of casual observation than as the object of 
sophisticated academic inquiry. Normative and doctrinal analyses of 
the phenomenon are virtually nonexistent, in part because the current 
ability to measure and report concentration is so limited. 
  This Article is the first attempt to measure capital-punishment 
concentration rigorously, by combining different sources of county-
level data and by borrowing quantitative tools that economists use to 
study market competition. The analysis yields three major findings: (1) 
capital sentencing is concentrating dramatically; (2) executions are 
concentrating more gradually; and (3) both trends persist within most 
capitally active states.  
  Certain normative and doctrinal conclusions follow from the 
empirical findings. The causes of concentration are likely to be more 
bureaucratic and path dependent than they are democratic and 
pragmatic, reflecting what I call the “muscle memory” of local 
institutional practice. If local muscle memory indeed explains 
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concentration, such concentration violates basic punishment norms 
requiring equal treatment of similar offenders. This problem 
notwithstanding, existing death penalty jurisprudence does not account 
for local concentration. For concentration to have any influence on the 
outcome of constitutional inquiry, the Supreme Court would have to 
revise its working definition of “arbitrariness.”  
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INTRODUCTION 
There is an obscure piece of gallows trivia about the death penalty 
in Texas. If Harris County seceded and was thereafter annexed as the 
fifty-first state, the story goes, then it would immediately become 
America’s second-most capitally active state jurisdiction—trailing only 
what remained of Texas. The data substantiate the story. Out of the 
1437 post-1976 executions carried out in American states, 126 of them 
ended the life of an inmate who was capitally sentenced in Harris 
County.1 In that same period, Texas put to death 411 inmates sentenced 
elsewhere.2 Oklahoma, the next state on the list, executed 112.3 
With respect to local irregularities, the execution bulge in Harris 
County is just the tip of the iceberg. Consider Caddo Parish, a small 
administrative division in northeast Louisiana with a nasty history of 
postbellum lynching.4 Caddo found itself the subject of a 2015 media 
firestorm when its interim District Attorney (DA), Dale Cox, publicly 
declared that the government ought to “kill more people.”5 Cox had 
spent years prosecuting capital crimes as Caddo’s first assistant DA, 
and his comments followed his anguished predecessor’s mea culpa for 
securing the wrongful conviction of Glenn Ford, a black man who was 
exonerated after almost thirty years on Louisiana’s death row.6 Cox’s 
influence shows just how sensitive capital-sentencing activity can be to 
the preferences of a local stakeholder: between 2010 and 2015, when 
the Shreveport newspapers published his comments, Cox had 
personally secured half of the state’s death verdicts.7 
 
 1. See Searchable Execution Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www. 
deathpenaltyinfo.org/views-executions [https://perma.cc/LY33-CNBS] (.csv file downloaded on 
Sept. 28, 2016). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See G. Ben Cohen, McCleskey’s Omission: The Racial Geography of Retribution, 10 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 65, 84–85 (2012). 
 5. See Campbell Robertson, The Prosecutor Who Says Louisiana Should ‘Kill More 
People,’ N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/08/us/louisiana-prosecutor-
becomes-blunt-spokesman-for-death-penalty.html [https://perma.cc/U7NU-GAS6]. 
 6. See Andrew Cohen, Freedom After 30 Years on Death Row, ATLANTIC (Mar. 11, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/03/freedom-after-30-years-on-death-row/2841 
79 [https://perma.cc/GC2S-GRG4]; Andrew Cohen, Glenn Ford, in the End, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/glenn-ford-end [https://perma.
cc/B95X-9CAE]. 
 7. Robert J. Smith, America’s Deadliest Prosecutors, SLATE (May 14, 2015, 3:54 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/05/america_s_deadliest_pro
secutors_death_penalty_sentences_in_louisiana_florida.htm [https://perma.cc/8V8E-9ZNW]. 
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There is a widespread belief that to study capital punishment is to 
scrutinize the “death belt,”8 a term referring to the southern states 
responsible for imposing and carrying out most American capital 
sentences. Regional and state aggregation of death penalty data, 
however, suppresses information about the concentration of capital 
process in smaller political units. Evaluating modern capital 
punishment patterns is less about understanding the electoral 
complexities of statewide decisionmaking than it is about 
understanding the administrative and political idiosyncrasies of 
counties, parishes, cities, and townships. The meaningful units of study 
are not Texas and Louisiana; they are Harris County and Caddo Parish. 
County-level data on death sentences and executions—together, 
what I call “capital outcomes”—are an increasingly important source 
of information about the death penalty.9 In Glossip v. Gross,10 the 
blockbuster capital case from the Supreme Court’s 2015 Term, county-
level data surfaced briefly in Justice Breyer’s dissent charting a course 
for categorical challenges to the death penalty.11 Exercising what seems 
like a prerogative of the Court’s longer-tenured members, Justice 
Breyer confessed a strong constitutional skepticism of capital 
punishment.12 The timing and content of Justice Breyer’s dissent invite 
comparisons to similar sentiments expressed by Justice Blackmun, who 
declared after twenty-four years on the bench that he would “no 
 
 8. See, e.g., Louis D. Bilionis & Richard A. Rosen, Lawyers, Arbitrariness, and the Eighth 
Amendment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1325 (1997) (noting the absence of reform in the “death belt” 
states); Michael Mello, Taking Caldwell v. Mississippi Seriously: The Unconstitutionality of 
Capital Statutes that Divide Sentencing Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 30 B.C. L. REV. 
283, 307 (1989) (discussing the evolution of capital sentencing law beyond the “death belt”). 
 9. See generally Meg Beardsley, Sam Kamin, Justin Marceau & Scott Phillips, Disquieting 
Discretion: Race, Geography & the Colorado Death Penalty in the First Decade of the Twenty-First 
Century, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 431 (2015) (analyzing racial and geographic variables for the 
Colorado death penalty); Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and Its 
Ramifications, 92 B.U. L. REV. 227 (2012) (analyzing county-level data on capital sentencing from 
2004–2009); James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, A Broken System: Error Rates in 
Capital Cases, 1973–1995, COLUM. L. SCH. (June 12, 2000), http://www2.law.columbia.edu/
instructionalservices/liebman/ [https://perma.cc/Y3QB-MXGY] [hereinafter Broken System I] 
(compiling county-level data on error rates in death penalty litigation); James S. Liebman, Jeffrey 
Fagan, Andrew Gelman, Valerie West, Garth Davies & Alexander Kiss, A Broken System, Part 
II: Why There Is So Much Error in Capital Cases, and What Can Be Done About It, COLUM. L. 
SCH. (Feb. 11, 2002), http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/index2.html [https://
perma.cc/X2HY-UGWZ] [hereinafter Broken System II] (analyzing data from Broken System I, 
supra). 
 10. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). 
 11. Id. at 2761–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 12. See id. at 2776–77. 
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longer . . . tinker with the machinery of death.”13 Joined by Justice 
Ginsburg, Justice Breyer argued that the Eighth Amendment likely 
forbids a capital-sentencing regime that is arbitrary because, among 
other reasons, “within a death penalty State, the imposition of the 
death penalty heavily depends on the county in which a defendant is 
tried.”14 Citing data from 2004 to 2009, Justice Breyer reported that 
nearly half of America’s death sentences are concentrated in less than 
1 percent of its counties.15 
Justice Breyer’s opinion reveals both the strengths and limits of 
existing data on the geographic distribution of capital punishment. 
Scholars are increasingly reporting the general conclusion, based on 
publicly available data, that both death sentences and executions are 
concentrated in a small set of local political units that still impose 
capital punishment.16 Such information, however, only scratches the 
surface. Simply reporting the number of counties practicing capital 
punishment omits several important pieces of information: the 
geographic distribution of activity levels, the change in distribution 
over time, whether capital punishment practice is concentrating within 
states, and how the distribution tracks variables like population and 
homicides. 
The need to understand concentration over time is particularly 
important because that phenomenon coincides with another one—the 
steep decline in the number of death sentences and executions. No 
scholarship grapples at significant length with how the combination of 
rising concentration and declining use implicates the normative 
justifications for and doctrinal administration of the death penalty. My 
objective here, therefore, is to frame and answer three crucial 
questions about the geographic distribution of capital outcomes: How 
much is concentration really increasing, what is the normative 
significance of that phenomenon, and what are its implications under 
existing doctrine? The precise constitutional device by which courts 
will incorporate information about local concentration is unclear, but 
Glossip signals rather unmistakably that a contingent of Justices thinks 
it should be moving in that direction. 
 
 13. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 14. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2761 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Smith, supra note 9, at 231–32). 
 15. Id. (citing Smith, supra note 9, at 233). 
 16. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 9, at 231–46 (breaking out capital sentence and execution data 
by county for the period from 2004–2009). 
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In Part I, I focus on the data, which disclose concentration of 
capital outcomes in a handful of localities. I use the term 
“concentration” to refer to an uneven geographic distribution of 
capital punishment activity within a political unit. If “intensity” refers 
to a given locality’s level of capital activity, then concentrated political 
units will have some high-intensity localities amidst many low-intensity 
ones. Although simple counting instruments have suggested some 
increased concentration, there has been virtually no development of 
metrics precisely quantifying the degree of concentration—metrics 
that would permit apples-to-apples comparisons across political units 
and time periods. Using new data and borrowing methodology used to 
flag anticompetitive conditions in economic markets, I develop three 
such metrics. Each metric I develop has individual shortcomings, but 
collectively they tell a consistent story. Over the last twenty years, there 
have been dramatic increases in the geographic concentration of death 
sentences, and moderate increases in the concentration of executions.17 
These effects are evident both nationally and—perhaps more 
importantly—within the most capitally active state jurisdictions. 
In Part II, I explore the normative significance of capital-outcome 
concentration, based on its plausible causes. High concentration levels 
do not correspond to population density or to the distribution of 
homicides, and are not substantially attributable to locally 
differentiated punishment norms. Instead, extreme capital-outcome 
concentration is likely the result of what I call “local muscle memory,” 
by which I mean correlated decisionmaking across multiple sites of 
local discretion. Correlated decisionmaking, in turn, refers to the idea 
that local actors influencing capital-sentencing outcomes exercise 
discretion in an environment that tends to produce momentum in favor 
of or against sustained capital activity. Local muscle memory produces 
a separating equilibrium for death penalties and executions: a few 
capitally active localities, and many more that tend towards abstention. 
In light of muscle memory, I evaluate the normative significance of 
capital-outcome concentration under consequentialist and retributivist 
accounts of the death penalty. If certain localities are cost-effective 
capital punishment “specialists,” then concentration might have a 
weak consequentialist justification; but such geographic distribution 
almost certainly violates retributivist constraints on punishment. That 
violation persists even under justificatory theory allowing localities to 
treat similar offenses differently. 
 
 17. See infra Part I.B 
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In Part III, I explain why, notwithstanding the considerable 
normative complications that it presents, capital-outcome 
concentration is unlikely to affect the constitutionality of the death 
penalty under existing jurisprudence. Of course, not every flaw in state 
criminal-justice administration corresponds with a corrective feature of 
positive law. Nevertheless, the doctrinal insensitivity to concentration 
is puzzling, as irregular punishment practice was an animating principle 
for modern death penalty law.18 If the Supreme Court is inclined to 
accommodate its death penalty doctrine to the reality of increasing 
capital-outcome concentration, then it needs to change its working 
definition of “arbitrariness.” More precisely, it would have to expand 
the definition to include not just capital-outcome patterns that are 
insufficiently sensitive to variables that should influence results, but 
also patterns that are too sensitive to variables that should not. 
I.  DATA ON CAPITAL OUTCOMES 
Although the legal community is generally aware that capital 
outcomes cluster geographically, that awareness remains quite limited 
in two respects. First, there are no established metrics for measuring 
capital-outcome concentration. Second, and partially because there are 
no such metrics, variation over time and across jurisdictions remains a 
mystery. In order to address both issues, I treat capital outcomes like a 
market. Death sentences and executions are the output, and counties 
are the firms. Using this framework, I can compute national and state-
by-state capital-outcome concentration values for any period of time. 
In recognition that no single value can convey all necessary 
information about capital-outcome concentration, I have developed 
three metrics: (1) a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), (2) an eight-
county concentration ratio (CR8), and (3) a “half-of-outcome index” 
(HOI). The HHI is the primary index of concentration, and the CR8 
and HOI are auxiliary indices that provide important pieces of 
information that the HHI omits. I compute these three values for each 
of four five-year periods between 1996 and 2015. I present detailed 
results in Part I.B, but there are three top-line findings: the 
concentration of death sentences is increasing very quickly, the 
concentration of executions is increasing more slowly, and both effects 
persist even within the most capitally active states. 
 
 18. See infra Part III.A.2.  
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A. Data and Method 
The “modern” American death penalty era began on July 2, 1976, 
when—after having invalidated all existing death penalty laws in 
Furman v. Georgia19—the Supreme Court decided five cases specifying 
the constitutional parameters for capital-sentencing statutes.20 For 
death sentences and executions, I compute separate concentration 
indices spanning the last twenty years of the modern era, from 1996 to 
2015. To obtain and evaluate my results, I analyzed four different 
datasets: decennial census data for 2000 and 2010;21 a new set of county-
level death-sentencing data from 1996 to 2015;22 publicly available 
county-level execution data from 1996 to 2015;23 and county-level 
 
 19. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 20. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). These cases are referred to as the “July 2 cases.” 
 21. This dataset comes from the United States Census Bureau. See USA Counties Data File 
Downloads, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/support/USACdataDownloads.
html#POP [https://perma.cc/NG3R-HQK4]. 
 22. These data were collected and compiled by Professor Brandon L. Garrett and are on file 
with the Duke Law Journal. As a starting point, Garrett used 1977–2013 data from the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics (BJS), computing the number of capital sentences in each state and using that 
number as a baseline “target” for independent corroboration. See Publications and Products: 
Capital Punishment, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbtp&tid
=18&iid=1 [https://perma.cc/HEA6-YDA3] (collecting BJS reports by year). Garrett then 
adjusted the targets based on verification and additional research. For the purposes of verifying 
the targets, Garrett obtained additional county-level data from the Eighth Amendment Project. 
Garrett reconciled the Eighth Amendment data with BJS data for the available years. Garrett 
then collected 2015 data and checked it against the dataset being generated by the Eighth 
Amendment Project. 
 To determine the county-level sentencing activity to be checked against the targets, 
Garrett worked from lists of death row inmates from the “Death Row USA” quarterly reports 
(which were biannual in the 1990s) published by the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund 
(LDF). The Death Row USA reports contained the names of all death row inmates, obtained 
from state and federal departments of corrections. See Death Row USA, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & 
EDUC. FUND, http://www.naacpldf.org/death-row-usa [https://perma.cc/DLX9-S3QA]. New 
names appearing on the NAACP LDF reports were assumed to be new sentences. Garrett cross-
checked the list generated from the NAACP LDF reports against those generated by capital 
postconviction centers in California, Illinois, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, and Virginia. 
After obtaining the list of new death row inmates, Garrett used Westlaw, state departments of 
corrections records, and news reports to determine the county in which the sentence was imposed. 
The counts per state and per year almost always exceeded the BJS counts, indicating that the 
results were more complete than the published BJS data. A defendant sentenced to death more 
than once—because the first sentence was overturned—will show up as two observations. 
 23. This dataset comes from the Death Penalty Information Center. See DEATH PENALTY 
INFO. CTR., supra note 1. 
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homicide data from 1999 to 2014.24 I focus only on state outcomes 
because the federal death penalty is extremely rare and considerably 
more centralized; it is neither conceptually nor empirically suitable for 
the analysis I perform here. I therefore excised forty-nine federal death 
sentences and three federal executions from the sentencing and 
execution datasets, respectively.25 I ended up with 3218 sentencing 
observations and 1106 execution observations. When I associate an 
execution observation with a county, I simply mean that the executed 
offender was convicted and capitally sentenced there. 
In order to study change over time, I assigned each entry in the 
sentencing and execution data to one of four periods: 1996 to 2000 
(period 1), 2001 to 2005 (period 2), 2006 to 2010 (period 3), or 2011 to 
2015 (period 4). Using census data, I associated a population value with 
each county, for each time period. I used a county’s 2000 census value 
to estimate its population for periods 1 and 2, and the 2010 census value 
for periods 3 and 4. For each period, I was able to associate fractions 
of populations, death sentences, and executions with every county in 
the United States. County-level census data are a major part of the 
HOI computations, but I also use it periodically to evaluate the 
influence of population in other circumstances. Similarly, I use the 
county-level homicide data to explore, where necessary, the 
relationship between capital outcomes and culpable murders. 
1. Metric Construction.  The methodological challenge is how to 
construct concentration metrics for larger political units—for example, 
a state or a country. A useful metric should be sensitive to at least two 
things: (1) the “evenness” of capital-outcome distribution across 
counties;26 and (2) the number of counties accounting for a capital 
sentence or an execution.27 There is higher evenness when each of n 
 
 24. This dataset comes from the Center for Disease Control (CDC), which keeps homicide 
statistics based on information in death certificates. See About Underlying Cause of Death, 1999–
2014, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, http://wonder.cdc.gov/ucd-icd10.html [https://perma.cc/
VQ4C-N9E9] [hereinafter CDC Data] (in category six, first select “Injury Intent and 
Mechanism,” and then select “Homicide” as the option for “Injury Intent”). 
 25. For both sentences and executions, I took out observations associated with an Article III 
court or with a military tribunal. 
 26. By “evenness,” I simply mean the degree to which the geographic distribution of 
punishment within a particular political unit deviates from a distribution across n counties in 
which each county accounts for 1/n percent of the political unit’s capital activity. 
 27. In other contexts, the number of categories is referred to as “richness.” See, e.g., Jim 
Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a Species of Information Policy, 89 IOWA L. 
REV. 495, 553 (2004) (using this term in the biodiversity context). 
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counties’ share of capital events approaches 1/n. The low-
concentration bound of a metric should correspond with perfectly even 
distribution across numerous counties; the high-concentration bound 
should correspond with a perfectly uneven distribution in which all 
capital punishment activity occurs in a single county. If values are 
computed for each period, then the results show the change in capital-
event concentration over time. 
In other disciplines, metrics called “diversity indices” are 
sometimes used to measure concentration in the way that I 
contemplate here. A diversity index is constructed from a dataset that 
contains a distribution of units across categories. More categories and 
greater evenness should push the index toward one extreme; fewer 
categories and less evenness should push the index toward the other. 
Ecologists use one such index to measure biodiversity in communities 
of animals distributed across different species.28 Information theorists 
rely on a diversity index to measure information content in bits 
distributed across alphanumeric characters.29 Economists use yet 
another diversity index to measure inequality in the distribution of 
wealth across people.30 
Although I construct three metrics to measure concentration, I 
rely most heavily on the HHI, a diversity index familiar to economists 
measuring industrial concentration.31 The HHI captures how outputs 
(units) are distributed across firms (categories). HHI is computed as a 
sum of squares of the fraction of each locality’s share of a particular 
capital punishment outcome: 
 HHI = o2j =1
n  
where n is the number of jurisdictions in which capital outcomes occur 
and o is the share of capital outcomes occurring in the jth jurisdiction. 
 
 28. “Simpson’s Diversity Index” is frequently used to quantify the biodiversity of a biotic 
community. For further explanation, see generally E.H. Simpson, Measurement of Diversity, 163 
NATURE 688 (1949). 
 29. “Shannon’s H” is the most famous such index. See CLAUDE E. SHANNON & WARREN 
WEAVER, THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION (1949); Claude E. Shannon, A 
Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL SYS. TECH. J. 379 (1948).  
 30. The “Gini Coefficient” is a diversity index often used to capture income inequality 
numerically. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. 
REV. 993, 998 n.21 (2004). 
 31. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, NATIONAL POWER AND THE STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN 
TRADE 159–60 (1945); Orris Clemens Herfindahl, Concentration in the Steel Industry 8–9 (1950) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with the Columbia University 
Library). 
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Depending on the capital outcome for which I am indexing 
concentration, the units of output are either capital sentences or 
executions. The firms are either counties or states. To phrase my 
approach analogically, I use a diversity index to track the concentration 
of capital outcomes like an antitrust regulator would use it to track 
market power. 
The index approaches 1/(number of firms) as the number of firms 
increases and as the distribution of output across firms becomes more 
even. Take two examples: 
Example 1: ten firms with 10 percent of market share each. 
Example 2: ten firms, with one firm having 91 percent market share 
and nine firms having 1 percent market share each. 
The HHI in Example 1 is 10 x (.1)2 = .1 because it is the sum of squares 
for ten firms, each with a 10 percent market share. The HHI in 
Example 2 is (.91)2 + 9(.01)2 = .829 because it is the sum of the squares 
for one firm with 91 percent of the market and for nine other firms 
having 1 percent of the market each. As the examples demonstrate, a 
lower HHI generally indicates lower market concentration and 
corresponds with a lower risk of anticompetitive activity.32 
When computing HHI values for capital outcomes, a county’s 
“market share” is the number of capital outcomes in that county 
divided by the sum of such outcomes across all counties that are part 
of the political unit for which the HHI is being computed—in my 
analysis, either a state or the country. Imagine that there were one 
hundred executions nationally for a particular time period, spread 
equally across ten counties. The HHI (execution) value would be .1, 
following the same logic as Example 1 above. Now imagine that, over 
the same period, there were one hundred death sentences imposed 
nationally across ten counties, but that ninety-one of them were in the 
most active county and that there was one death sentence in each of 
the remaining nine counties. The HHI (sentence) value would be .829, 
following the same logic as Example 2 above. 
I also present two auxiliary metrics to measure capital-outcome 
concentration. First, I compute a “CR8” concentration ratio. Before 
they were displaced by HHI, economists studying mergers used to rely 
heavily on concentration ratios to analyze the distribution of power in 
 
 32. The Department of Justice started using the HHI to analyze mergers in 1982. See U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES 12–15 (1982), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11248.pdf [https://perma.cc/4G35-T2NH]. 
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a market.33 A CR(n) concentration ratio is computed using market 
shares for the largest n firms, so a CR8 concentration ratio reports a 
value for the eight largest industry participants. Perfectly competitive 
markets will have CR(n) values approaching 0, and monopolistic or 
highly oligopolistic markets will have CR(n) values approaching 1. A 
CR8 value for a particular capital outcome would be the fraction of 
capital outcomes attributable to the eight most active counties. If one 
hundred executions were dispersed equally across ten counties, then 
the CR8 (execution) value would be .8, the sum of eight counties with 
10 percent shares. If there were one hundred death sentences 
nationally, if ninety-one of them were in one county, and if each of the 
remaining nine were each from a different county, then the CR8 
(sentence) value would be .98—one county with 91 percent of the 
market and seven counties with 1 percent each. 
Second, I compute what I call an HOI, which refers to the fraction 
of the population accounting for half of a political unit’s capital 
outcomes. For example, assume that the country has executed 500 
offenders in a given period. Starting with the most capitally active 
county, an HOI computation requires that the number of executions 
from the next-most-active counties be added until the sum reaches 
250—half of the country’s 500 executions. The final step in the HOI 
computation is to determine the fraction of the U.S. population living 
in the counties necessary to reach the 250-outcome threshold.34 
When there is an increased concentration of capital outcomes in a 
political unit, the HHI and CR8 go up, and the HOI goes down. The 
HHI is the best index of concentration, because it measures both the 
evenness of a distribution and the number of counties across which 
capital outcomes are distributed. Notwithstanding their substantial 
weaknesses (detailed below), the auxiliary indices provide additional 
information that the HHI does not. The CR8 provides information 
about whether the most capitally active counties are driving the change 
in concentration, and the HOI tracks concentration in terms of the 
fraction of the population that practices the death penalty. 
 
 33. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 494 n.5 (1974) (relying on 
CR2, CR4, and CR10 values); United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 281 (1966) 
(White, J., concurring) (relying on CR4, CR8, and CR12 values). In 1982, the Department of 
Justice ended the formal use of concentration ratios by excising them from its Merger Guidelines. 
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 32.  
 34. If reaching the 50 percent mark requires only a fraction of a county, then I only added 
that fraction of the county’s population to the sum that determines HOI. 
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2. Methodological Objections and Explanatory Limitations.  HHI 
is, naturally, an imperfect metric. There are certain theoretical 
objections that I do not address in depth here. Some have argued, for 
example, that HHI might be too sensitive to changes in evenness,35 and 
others have argued that it might be too sensitive to changes in the 
number of categories.36 Perhaps the most established criticism of HHI 
is that it is insufficiently sensitive to changes at extremely high and low 
levels of concentration—that it is incapable of achieving precision near 
its maximum and minimum values.37 
The other concerns about HHI are less methodological objections 
than they are explanatory limitations. The biggest explanatory limit is 
that HHI discloses nothing about what is causing changes in the index 
value. Many different phenomena could produce similar changes to the 
bottom-line index, and the normative implications of those changes 
might differ accordingly. None of the metrics I present is capable of 
showing correlation in the way, for example, a multivariate regression 
analysis might demonstrate that homicide rates among certain 
subpopulations predict capital punishment activity.38 By computing 
CR8 and HHI, however, I have made a modest effort to present the 
degree to which the concentration of capital outcomes is tracking 
population. 
Another explanatory limit involves the effect of observations 
where n = 0; that is, when a state or county either has no death 
sentences or no executions. Conceptually, if there are five capitally 
active counties, that capital activity should correspond with different 
concentration depending on whether that state also contains five 
capitally inactive counties, or fifty. The HHI, however, will be the same 
in both circumstances. This issue would not affect longitudinal analysis 
within a state, but it might complicate comparisons between states. To 
 
 35. See, e.g., Michael O. Finkelstein & Richard M. Friedberg, The Application of an Entropy 
Theory of Concentration to the Clayton Act, 76 YALE L.J. 677, 706 (1967) (calling this objection 
the “small firm problem”). 
 36. See, e.g., David Scheffman, Malcolm Coate & Louis Silvia, Twenty Years of Merger 
Guidelines Enforcement at the FTC: An Economic Perspective, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 277, 283 (2003) 
(“[T]he HHI probably overemphasizes the potential competitive impact of the purchase of a 
competitor with a very small share by a competitor with a larger share . . . .”). 
 37. See Amber E. Boydstun, Shaun Bevan & Herschel F. Thomas III, The Importance of 
Attention Diversity and How to Measure It, 42 POL’Y STUD. J. 173, 181 (2014). 
 38. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Death Sentence Rates and County Demographics: An 
Empirical Study, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 347, 356–57 (2005). Another example is that concentration 
might be desirable if the concentration is occurring in jurisdictions with the highest concentration 
of capital murder. 
KOVARSKY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2016  10:06 AM 
272  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:259 
address this issue in this Article, I report the fraction of counties that 
are capitally active within each state, and I report HOI values that are 
more conducive to interstate comparison.39 
A final explanatory concern about HHI—in fact, about any metric 
I could report—is that there is no objectively verifiable way to test 
whether capital outcomes are “too concentrated.” In a market context, 
economists can observe whether a change in HHI produces market 
structure conducive to supracompetitive pricing. In a capital 
punishment context, however, there is no real-world behavior that 
discloses whether the HHI is appropriately signaling concentration. 
The appropriate distribution of capital outcomes is a purely normative 
question. I direct considerable effort to that question in Part II, 
although the answer will never involve a magic number. 
The auxiliary indices have some strengths, but also obvious 
limitations. The CR8 maps more intuitively onto things one might say 
about capital outcomes in the real world. If the CR8 goes from .45 to 
.55, the eight busiest counties are accounting for an additional ten 
percentage points of a capital outcome. The CR8, however, discloses 
nothing about capital-outcome concentration across the eight most 
active counties or across the remaining ones—even though the 
concentration of activity within each group might be extremely 
important. Moreover, selecting eight counties is arbitrary.40 Eight is not 
inherently superior to six or to ten, but I chose that number because it 
is neither too big nor too small to differentiate meaningfully between 
the various political units that I am analyzing. The HOI provides per 
capita information that neither the HHI nor the CR8 contains, but it 
also amplifies the worst features of the CR8. It reveals nothing about 
the distribution of capital outcomes across the counties that account 
for 50 percent of events, and it reveals nothing about the distribution 
of capital outcomes across the rest. 
HHI is just one piece of a larger diagnostic puzzle. To be too harsh 
on it because it fails to capture every nuance of the underlying data is 
 
 39. For very granular comparison between different state jurisdictions, there are quantitative 
techniques available to further eliminate the “n = 0” problem. For instance, a “Gini Index” is a 
widespread metric used to compare levels of income inequality between different countries. See 
Richard H. McAdams, Economic Costs of Inequality, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 24 n.6 (2010). 
Generally speaking, the Gini Index measures deviation from a perfectly even distribution of 
income. A synthetic Gini Index could be constructed for capital outcomes by assigning a fraction 
of each capital outcome to every person in each county, and computing the “inequality.” 
 40. Cf. Finkelstein & Friedberg, supra note 35, at 680 (leveling arbitrariness criticism at the 
practice of using concentration ratios for merger analysis). 
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to miss the point of an index. Even without the auxiliary indices, the 
HHI would provide meaningful information about the national 
concentration of death sentences and executions. Because the auxiliary 
indices do disclose some of the information that HHI does not, the 
three metrics collectively reveal information that an HHI-only analysis 
might have missed. 
B. Results 
In Tables 1 through 8, I present the most noteworthy results of my 
analysis. Table 1 shows national HHI values by period, for both death 
sentences and executions. The HHI values for death sentences increase 
each period, which signals growing concentration. The HHI values for 
executions similarly increase each period, except between periods 3 
and 4, where there appears to be some corrective dispersion in 
response to substantially increased concentration between periods 2 
and 3.41 
I have also listed the number of states and counties that sentenced 
an offender to death in the pertinent periods. The number of counties 
with death sentences fell in each period (509, 330, 268, 183), as did the 
number of counties with executions (200, 178, 128, 106). In period 1, 
16.2 percent of American counties imposed a death sentence; by period 
4, that figure sat at 5.8 percent. In period 1, 6.4 percent of American 
counties sentenced someone who was actually executed; by period 4, 
only 3.4 percent of American counties did. Those numbers mirror 
considerable concentration in state-level capital punishment practice, 
both for death sentences and executions. 
  
 
 41. By “corrective dispersion,” I simply mean a regression to a less severely sloped trend 
line. 
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Table 1: HHI Values for Death Sentences and Executions (National) 
 1996–2000 2001–2005 2006–2010 2011–2015 
Death Sentences (n = 1421) (n = 772) (n = 637) (n = 388) 
Counties with a Death 
Sentence 
509 (16.2%) 330 (10.5%) 268 (8.5%) 183 (5.8%) 
States with a Death 
Sentence 
36 34 31 26 
HHI .0080 .0099 .0140 .0175 
Executions (n = 370) (n = 318) (n = 230) (n = 188) 
Counties with an 
Execution 
200 (6.4%) 178 (5.7%) 128 (4.1%) 106 (3.4%) 
States with an 
Execution 
28 21 22 14 
HHI .0122 .0183 .0307 .0192 
 
Table 2 shows national CR8 values by period. The CR8 values 
behave the same way that the HHI values do. For death sentences, they 
increase every period; for executions, they do the same, except 
between periods 3 and 4. As is the case with HHI, however, the CR8 
value for executions in period 4 still shows more concentration than 
does the value in period 2. Table 2 also includes the fraction of the 
national population housed in the eight most capitally active counties. 
These values were relatively stable over time for both death sentences 
and executions, with a slight decrease for death sentences and slight 
increase for executions. (As I will explain later, that stability likely 
reflects the largely stable composition of capitally active counties.) 
Table 2: CR8 Values for Death Sentences and Executions (National) 
 1996–2000 2001–2005 2006–2010 2011–2015 
Death Sentences (n = 1421) (n = 772) (n = 637) (n = 388) 
CR8 Values 17.66% 21.24% 25.12% 29.64% 
Fraction of Population 
in CR8 Counties 
9.88% 8.26% 7.46% 8.47% 
Executions (n = 370) (n = 318) (n = 230) (n = 188) 
CR8 Values 22.43% 27.99% 33.91% 29.26% 
Fraction of Population 
in CR8 Counties 
3.77% 3.41% 3.83% 4.79% 
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Table 3 contains national HOI values by period. The HOI falls in 
every period for death sentences; for executions, it conforms to the 
more general pattern of concentration followed by abrupt dispersion 
in period 4. Worth noting, however, is that the number of counties 
generating 50 percent of the executions does in fact decrease over 
every period in the data. Generally speaking and over time, a shrinking 
fraction of the American population has become responsible for a 
larger fraction of both death sentences and executions. 
Table 3: HOI Percent Values for Death Sentences and Executions 
(National) 
 1996–2000 2001–2005 2006–2010 2011–2015 
Death Sentences (n = 1421) (n = 772) (n = 637) (n = 388) 
Counties Containing 
50 Percent of Death 
Sentences (Fractional 
for Final County) 
59.70 47.25 36.13 28.33 
Percentage of U.S. 
Population 
23.68% 20.75% 17.07% 13.53% 
Executions (n = 370) (n = 318) (n = 230) (n = 188) 
Counties Containing 
50 Percent of 
Executions (Fractional 
for Final County) 
38.50 32.50 24.00 22.00 
Percentage of U.S. 
Population 
7.79% 6.02% 5.00% 8.07% 
 
Table 4 is a state-level detail of the five states with the most death 
sentences: California, Texas, Florida, Alabama, and North Carolina. 
Between periods 1 and 4, each state experienced heightened 
concentration. Increases in California, Alabama, and North Carolina 
were substantial. The increases in Texas and Florida were more 
moderate, with the CR8 value for Florida actually showing a bit of 
dispersion over the period the dataset covers. The values for the 
concentration metrics at the state level were considerably more volatile 
than they were at the national level. The state with the most substantial 
change was North Carolina, which went from being a heavy sentencer 
during period 1 to having only seven death sentences in seven different 
counties during period 4. 
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Table 4: All Values for Death Sentences (State-Level) 
 1996–2000 2001–2005 2006–2010 2011–2015 
California (n = 483) (n = 187) (n = 98) (n = 121) (n = 78) 
Counties with Death 
Sentences 24 (41.4%) 22 (37.9%) 22 (37.9%) 14 (24.1%) 
HHI .1526 .1160 .1543 .2173 
CR8 81.28% 76.53% 83.47% 91.03% 
HOI 35.98% 40.53% 33.68% 29.68% 
Texas (n = 448) (n = 197) (n = 138) (n = 69) (n = 44) 
Counties with Death 
Sentences 53 (20.9%) 34 (13.4%) 28 (11.0%) 18 (7.1%) 
HHI .1101 .1181 .0737 .1198 
CR8 64.97% 72.46% 62.32% 72.73% 
HOI 36.23% 33.63% 41.26% 32.89% 
Florida (n = 372) (n = 133) (n = 73) (n = 89) (n = 77) 
Counties with Death 
Sentences 
32 (47.8%) 26 (38.8%) 30 (44.8%) 34 (50.7%) 
HHI .0540 .0512 .0653 .0585 
CR8 56.39% 53.42% 57.30% 53.25% 
HOI 47.37% 42.82% 25.30% 33.63% 
Alabama (n = 218) (n = 83) (n = 47) (n = 56) (n = 32) 
Counties with Death 
Sentences 
28 (41.8%) 21 (31.3%) 24 (35.8%) 17 (25.4%) 
HHI .0666 .0928 .0931 .1074 
CR8 60.24% 70.21% 64.29% 71.88% 
HOI 34.83% 20.97% 26.73% 26.31% 
North Carolina 
(n = 169) 
(n = 109) (n = 37) (n = 16) (n = 7) 
Counties with Death 
Sentences 
39 (39.0%) 26 (26.0%) 14 (14.0%) 7 (7.0%) 
HHI .0437 .0533 .0859 .1429 
CR8 47.71% 51.35% 62.50% 100.00% 
HOI 29.57% 10.96% 22.14% 5.16% 
 
KOVARSKY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2016  10:06 AM 
2016]     CONCENTRATION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 277 
Table 5 presents, for executions, the same state-level information 
as in Table 4. There is concentration evident in every state except 
Florida, which shows increased dispersion across every metric. As with 
capital sentencing, the period-to-period volatility of execution 
concentration is greater at the state level than it is at the national one. 
Texas accounts for almost 40 percent of American executions, so the 
substantial concentration there is particularly significant nationally. 
Virginia is to executions what North Carolina is to capital sentences: it 
went from having reasonably dispersed executions in period 1 to 
having only three executions in three different counties during period 
4. 
Table 5: All Values for Executions (State-Level) 
 1996–2000 2001–2005 2006–2010 2011–2015 
Texas (n = 427) (n = 135) (n = 116) (n = 109) (n = 67) 
Counties with Executions 57 (22.4%) 43 (16.9%) 35 (13.8%) 27 (10.6%) 
HHI .0573 .0663 .1206 .0916 
CR8 53.33% 56.03% 69.72% 68.65% 
HOI 42.56% 38.98% 31.66% 35.21% 
Oklahoma (n = 112) (n = 24) (n = 49) (n = 15) (n = 18) 
Counties with Executions 14 (18.2%) 15 (19.5%) 11 (14.3%) 9 (13.0%) 
HHI .1528 .2886 .1111 .1852 
CR8 75.00% 85.71% 80.00% 94.44% 
HOI 36.47% 18.76% 36.72% 31.41% 
Virginia (n = 82) (n = 52) (n = 13) (n = 14) (n = 3) 
Counties with Executions 27 (19.9%) 13 (9.6%) 12 (8.9%) 3 (2.2%) 
HHI .0562 .0769 .1020 .3333 
CR8 59.62% 61.54% 71.43% 100.00% 
HOI 16.35% 3.79% 10.41% 0.43% 
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Missouri (n = 69) (n = 29) (n = 20) (n = 1) (n = 19) 
Counties with Executions 14 (12.2%) 11 (9.6%) 1 (.9%) 10 (8.7%) 
HHI .1153 .1750 1.000 .1468 
CR8 79.31% 85.00% 100.00% 89.47% 
HOI 28.34% 18.89% 28.00% 28.33% 
Florida (n = 55) (n = 14) (n = 10) (n = 9) (n = 22) 
Counties with Executions 10 (14.9%) 10 (14.9%) 9 (13.4%) 14 (20.9%) 
HHI .1224 .1000 .1111 .0992 
CR8 85.71% 80.00% 88.89% 72.73% 
HOI 8.00% 5.70% 6.73% 25.04% 
 
Table 6 is a county-level detail for capital sentencing. Because 
there are no subunits capable of generating values for HHI, CR8, or 
HOI, I simply provide, by period, the activity level of each of the ten 
counties with the most death sentences. Los Angeles County is far and 
away the leading producer of capital sentences, and was the leader for 
three of the four periods. All of the active death sentencing counties 
are extremely populous, with the exception of Oklahoma County, 
Oklahoma and Duval County, Florida. Consistent with the national 
trend, executions are decreasing in almost every featured county. And, 
consistent with the data reported in the previous tables, the outlier is 
in Florida—Duval County executed a nontrivially greater number of 
people during periods 3 and 4 than it did during periods 1 and 2. 
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Table 6: Activity Level of Each of the Ten Counties with the Most 
Death Sentences (County-Level) 
Ten Counties with 
the Most Death 
Sentences 
Largest City in 
Each County 
(2010) 
County Rankings by U.S. Population 
1996–
2000 
2001–
2005 
2006–
2010 
2011–
2015 
Los Angeles, CA 
(n = 152) 
1st  
(L.A.) 
1st  
(n = 62) 
2nd  
(n = 26) 
1st  
(n = 38) 
1st  
(n = 26) 
Harris, TX 
(n = 117) 
3rd  
(Houston) 
2nd  
(n = 56) 
1st  
(n = 38) 
t-7th 
(n = 11) 
5th  
(n = 12) 
Maricopa, AZ 
(n = 96) 
4th  
(Phoenix) 
11th  
(n = 15) 
3rd 
(n = 25) 
2nd  
(n = 38) 
3rd  
(n = 18) 
Riverside, CA 
(n = 80) 
11th  
(Riverside) 
4th  
(n = 24) 
t-7th 
(n = 13) 
3rd  
(n = 20) 
2nd  
(n = 23) 
Dallas, TX 
(n = 52) 
9th  
(Dallas) 
8th  
(n = 21) 
t-5th 
(n = 16) 
t-10th 
(n = 9) 
t-5th  
(n = 6) 
Oklahoma, OK 
(n = 50) 
80th  
(Okla. City) 
t-9th 
(n = 18) 
4th  
(n = 18) 
t-7th 
(n = 11) 
t-20th 
(n = 3) 
Clark, NV 
(n = 49) 
14th  
(Las Vegas) 
t-6th 
(n = 22) 
t-12th 
(n = 9) 
t-7th 
(n = 11) 
t-5th  
(n = 7) 
Orange, CA 
(n = 48) 
6th  
(Anaheim) 
t-6th 
(n = 19) 
t-14th 
(n = 7) 
5th  
(n = 14) 
t-6th  
(n = 8) 
Duval, FL 
(n = 48) 
59th 
(Jacksonville) 
18th  
(n = 13) 
t-18th 
(n = 7) 
4th  
(n = 15) 
4th  
 (n = 13) 
Philadelphia, PA 
(n = 44) 
21st 
(Phila.) 
3rd  
(n = 27) 
t-9th  
(n = 9) 
t-19th 
(n = 6) 
t-34th 
(n = 2) 
 
Table 7 presents for executions the same information that Table 6 
presented for death sentences. (Because of ties, there are actually 
twelve entries in the table.) More executed offenders were sentenced 
in Harris County, Texas than in any other local jurisdiction. Seven of 
the top twelve producers of executions are from Texas. Unlike capital 
sentences, however, executions do not cluster exclusively in populous 
counties. Half of the twelve aforementioned counties are not in the top 
forty counties nationally, by 2010 population. The national slowdown 
is not as universal across the capitally active localities, however, as only 
Harris and Tarrant Counties (both in Texas) had dropped more than 
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50 percent between periods 1 and 4. Oklahoma County was the most 
volatile, dropping from twenty-five executions in period 2 to two 
executions in period 3. Harris, Dallas, Oklahoma, and Maricopa are 
the only counties appearing in both Table 6 and Table 7. 
Table 7: Activity Level of Each of the Ten Counties with the Most 
Executions (County-Level) 
Ten Counties with 
the Most Executions 
Largest City in 
Each County 
(2010) 
County Rankings by U.S. Population 
1996–
2000 
2001–
2005 
2006–
2010 
2011–
2015 
Harris, TX 
(n = 85) 
3rd  
(Houston) 
1st  
(n = 21) 
2nd 
(n = 23) 
1st 
(n = 31) 
t-2nd 
(n = 10) 
Dallas, TX 
(n = 47) 
9th  
(Dallas) 
3rd 
(n = 13) 
3rd 
(n = 9) 
2nd 
(n = 13) 
1st 
(n = 12) 
Oklahoma, OK 
(n = 40) 
80th  
(Okla. City) 
4th 
(n = 8) 
1st 
(n = 25) 
t-13th 
(n = 2) 
t-4th 
(n = 5) 
Tarrant, TX 
(n = 34) 
15th 
(Fort Worth) 
2nd 
(n = 15) 
t-6th 
(n = 6) 
4th 
(n = 9) 
t-7th 
(n = 4) 
Bexar, TX 
(n = 33) 
18th 
(San Antonio) 
t-5th 
(n = 7) 
t-12th 
(n = 4) 
3rd 
(n = 12) 
t-2nd 
(n = 10) 
St. Louis, MO 
(n = 16) 
40th  
(Clayton) 
t-14th 
(n = 4) 
t-4th 
(n = 7) 
N/A 
(n = 0) 
t-4th 
(n = 5) 
Tulsa, OK 
(n = 16) 
100+ 
(Tulsa) 
t-22nd 
(n = 3) 
t-9th 
(n = 5) 
t-6th 
(n = 3) 
t-4th  
(n = 5) 
Montgomery, TX 
(n = 13) 
100+ 
(Conroe) 
t-22nd 
(n = 3) 
t-4th  
(n = 7) 
t-36th 
(n = 1) 
t-18th 
(n = 2) 
Smith, TX 
(n = 12) 
100+ 
(Tyler) 
t-14th 
(n = 4) 
t-14th 
(n = 3) 
t-13th 
(n = 2) 
t-11th 
 (n = 3) 
Nueces, TX 
(n = 11) 
100+ 
(Corpus Christi) 
t-32nd 
(n = 2) 
t-6th 
(n = 6) 
N/A 
(n = 0) 
t-11th 
 (n = 3) 
Pima, AZ 
(n = 11) 
42nd 
(Tucson) 
t-5th 
(n = 7) 
N/A 
(n = 0) 
N/A 
(n = 0) 
t-7th  
(n = 4) 
Maricopa, AZ 
(n = 11) 
4th  
(Phoenix) 
t-9th 
(n = 5) 
N/A 
(n = 0) 
t-13th 
(n = 2) 
t-7th  
(n = 4) 
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Finally, Table 8 uses Center for Disease Control (CDC) data to 
show, both nationally and for select state jurisdictions, a relationship 
between the distribution of capital sentences and homicides.42 
Specifically, I computed each county’s fraction of national and state 
homicides, and associated that information with capital-sentencing 
data. For example, during period 1, counties responsible for half of 
American capital sentences also accounted for 36.2 percent of its 
intentional homicides. By period 4, the counties responsible for half of 
capital sentencing covered only 18.7 percent of the country’s 
intentional homicides. The period 4 value is smaller than the period 1 
value in every jurisdiction, with the change nationally being more 
dramatic than what is observed in most individual states. 
Table 8: Fraction of Homicides that Account for Half of the Capital 
Sentences, Within Select Jurisdictions (National and State-Level) 
 1996–2000 2001–2005 2006–2010 2011–2016 
United States 36.2% 31.1% 24.5% 18.7% 
California 45.1% 49.2% 44.4% 41.8% 
Texas 53.5% 51.0% 58.1% 49.2% 
Florida 49.0% 27.6% 22.4% 36.4% 
Alabama 50.8% 29.3% 42.4% 34.8% 
North Carolina 31.4% 13.7% 15.9% 3.8% 
C. Preliminary Observations 
The data show that the concentration of capital sentences is 
increasing precipitously.43 The concentration of executions is 
increasing unambiguously but more slowly, with different metrics 
showing some dispersion in periods 3 and 4.44 There is considerable 
information residing in the concentration index values for individual 
states, too. Those values strongly suggest that increasing national 
concentration is not simply happening because fewer states retain 
capital punishment, but because such practice is concentrating even 
 
 42. See CDC Data, supra note 24. 
 43. See supra Tables 1–3. 
 44. See supra Tables 1–3. 
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within retentionist states.45 They also show that, within individual 
states, execution concentration is happening more slowly than 
sentencing concentration. Florida, however, stands out as the major 
source of data that are inconsistent with the global trends, showing a 
considerably more jagged trendline for both capital sentences and 
executions. 
1. Capital Sentences.  As the number of capital sentences fell in 
periods 1 through 4, the practice also became considerably more 
concentrated. The number of counties with death sentences fell from 
509 to 183, and the number of states with death sentences fell from 
thirty-six to twenty-six.46 At the same time, the national HHI (counties) 
more than doubled, from .0080 to .0175.47 The CR8 went from 17.66 
percent to 29.64 percent,48 which means that the fraction of death 
sentences in the eight most active counties went up by about 50 
percent. The data are not showing just that fewer counties are 
responsible for the capital sentences, but fewer people; the HOI values 
indicate that the fraction of the population residing in capitally active 
counties fell from about 23 to about 13 percent.49 Moreover, every 
metric showed increased concentration over every period—not just 
when comparing period 4 to period 1.50 
The information in the preceding paragraph shows that there is 
increasing concentration nationally, but it does not itself disclose how 
that concentration happened. One might hypothesize that 
concentration has increased only because fewer states are practicing 
the death penalty. After all, roughly four states abandoned the death 
penalty during each period in the data.51 A good way to test that 
hypothesis is to look at the most active capital-sentencing states—
California, Texas, Florida, Alabama, and North Carolina—and see 
whether the national trend is reproduced there. 
 
 45. See supra Tables 4, 5. 
 46. See supra Table 1. 
 47. See supra Table 1. 
 48. See supra Table 2. 
 49. See supra Table 3. 
 50. See supra Tables 1–3. 
 51. Thirty-six states capitally sentenced someone in period 1, thirty-four in period 2, thirty-
one in period 3, and twenty-six in period 4. See supra Table 1. 
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Table 4 contains the state-level detail, and every capitally active 
state except Florida experienced substantial concentration.52 The most 
dramatic concentration was in North Carolina, where HHI more than 
tripled. Concentration index values for states do (predictably) exhibit 
a little more period-to-period volatility than do national values. For 
example, California appeared to experience some dispersion between 
periods 1 and 2; both Texas and Alabama experienced the same 
between periods 2 and 3. The state-level detail nonetheless shows that 
increasing national concentration is due substantially to increased 
concentration within retentionist states. 
The county-level detail in Table 6 shows that localities are indeed 
reproducing the national trend line, as only one of the ten most active 
capital-sentencing counties had more death sentences in period 4 than 
in period 1. In terms of its effect on HHI, that trend likely offsets some 
of the concentration occurring as infrequent county producers of 
capital sentences become abstainers in subsequent periods. 
2. Executions.  The results for executions are a little more difficult 
to interpret. The HHI and CR8 values show increased concentration 
between periods 1 and 4, but the intermediate values exhibit more 
volatility than they did in the capital sentencing context.53 The HHI and 
CR8 values for executions show a substantial jump in concentration 
between periods 2 and 3, so there is some corrective dispersion 
between periods 3 and 4. (The period 4 values do, however, show more 
concentration than there was during period 2.) The HOI trendline 
looks a bit different, as HOI actually rises between periods 1 and 4. The 
HOI values do show the jump in concentration between periods 1 and 
3, and show dispersion in period 4. 
The state-level detail—which shows concentration trends in 
Texas, Oklahoma, Virginia, Missouri, and Florida—also paints a more 
complicated picture. For every state except Florida, both HHI and 
CR8 values show increased concentration between periods 1 and 4. 
The HOI values, however, showed substantially more concentration 
only in Texas, Oklahoma, and Virginia. HOI values were roughly the 
same in Missouri, and actually rose in Florida. The period-to-period 
volatility of all three metrics was considerably greater than it was for 
capital sentences. 
 
 52. Florida did show nontrivial increases in concentration according to HHI and HOI 
metrics; CR8 showed minimal dispersion. See supra Table 4. 
 53. See supra Tables 1–3. 
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In the end, because Texas, Oklahoma, and Virginia account for 
621 of the 1106 executions in the data (56.15 percent), the considerable 
concentration in those three states dominates the more ambiguous 
effects in some of the other execution-intensive jurisdictions. The 
heightened concentration in these capitally active states suggests that 
increased national concentration of executions is not attributable 
simply to the number of states with an execution falling from twenty-
eight to fourteen.54 The national concentration also reflects 
concentration within individual states. Moreover, the county-level data 
in Texas and Virginia indicate that executions are concentrating in 
those states not so much because the capitally active counties are 
responsible for more executions, but because a number of infrequent 
producers became abstainers.55 
Unlike the counties responsible for most death sentences, and as 
mentioned above, the counties responsible for the most executions are 
not all among the country’s most populous. Oklahoma County is 
perhaps the most visible example. Although it accounted for just .23 
percent of the national population during period 2, it was responsible 
for 7.86 percent of the country’s executions. Between 2001 and 2005, 
then, Oklahoma County was “overrepresented” as a producer of 
executions by over 3300 percent. 
One might expect to observe more overlap between counties 
producing the most executions and those producing the most capital 
sentences. Some of the overlap disappears because California executed 
only eleven offenders56 despite having imposed 483 capital sentences.57 
Some actual overlap might also be disguised by the lag between the 
moment of sentencing and the moment of execution. A comparison of 
the results for capital sentences and executions nevertheless invites a 
broader question that is largely beyond the scope of this paper: What 
phenomena are causing them to cluster differently within state 
jurisdictions?58 I strongly suspect that the differences are attributable 
to the way states structure the process of issuing “death warrants”—
 
 54. The surge in period 3 concentration nationally also mirrors the enormous surge in period 
3 concentration for Texas. Compare period 3 in Tables 1–3 (showing a surge in national 
concentration), supra, with period 3 in Table 5, supra (showing that the number of counties with 
an execution in Texas fell from 35 to 27 between period 3 and period 4). 
 55. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra Table 5. 
 56. See supra note 1. 
 57. See supra Table 4.  
 58. Compare supra Table 4 (providing all values for death sentences at the state level), with 
supra Table 5 (providing all values for executions at the state level). 
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orders specifying the date and method of execution—but I mostly leave 
that question for another day.59 For the purposes of this Article, 
readers should simply understand that capital sentences and executions 
cluster differently, rather than why. 
II. JUSTIFICATION IN LIGHT OF LOCAL MUSCLE MEMORY 
Capital sentences and executions are concentrating in a smaller 
number of localities—both nationally and, for the most part, within 
capitally active states. Part II considers, in light of causation that is 
largely bureaucratic and path dependent, how such concentration 
squares with the familiar normative justifications for the death penalty: 
deterrence (consequentialism) and retribution.60 
The geographic distribution of death sentences and executions 
does not reflect the concentration of population, the distribution of 
homicides, or locally differentiated punishment norms. Although the 
data in Part I are incapable of proving this proposition, I argue that the 
driving force behind the concentration are likely to be more 
bureaucratic than democratic, and more path dependent than 
pragmatic. It results from what I have called “local muscle memory,” 
which is correlated decisionmaking across local sites of discretion. The 
correlation produces the separating equilibrium evident in the data—a 
small cluster of capitally active counties that coexist with a much larger 
set of counties that abstain from the death penalty entirely. 
In light of the role that local muscle memory likely plays, there 
might be a weak and empirically speculative consequentialist defense 
of concentration: that capitally active localities efficiently produce 
deterrence and impose sentences with the most nondeterrent utility.61 
By contrast, there appears to be no retributivist defense capable of 
honoring a commitment to “comparative proportionality,” the 
 
 59. Some states have a centralized entity, such as a governor or supreme court, that 
determines the execution queue; other states rely heavily on the local stakeholders to determine 
whether to go forward with the execution. In the latter scenario, there is more likely to be 
concentration in light of the political and professional opportunities that proceeding with an 
execution presents. 
 60. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441 (2008) (“Gregg instructs that capital 
punishment is excessive when it is grossly out of proportion to the crime or it does not fulfill the 
two distinct social purposes served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital 
crimes.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (describing retribution and deterrence as 
“social purposes served by the death penalty”); IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL 
PUNISHMENT 9–13 (1989) (introducing readers to utilitarianism and deterrence as the major 
“philosophical theories of punishment”). 
 61. See infra Part II.B.1.  
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principle that similar offenders should receive similar punishment. 
There is certainly debate over a pure retributivist’s appropriate 
commitment to comparative proportionality, but I do not want to dwell 
too much on that point.62 Even if the retributivist jettisons any interest 
in comparative proportionality, capital-outcome concentration still 
violates a basic equality norm of modern punishment practice.63 The 
philosophical harm in the practiced reality of locally differentiated 
capital punishment activity is the unjustified failure to treat similar 
cases similarly, regardless of what penological theory most readily 
accounts for that principle. 
A. Local Muscle Memory 
Normative discussion of capital-outcome concentration requires 
an exclusion of certain causes. Concentration does not reflect 
population or the distribution of homicides, and it does not happen 
because juries effectively transmit a community’s punishment norms 
through verdicts. The cause more likely involves local muscle memory: 
some combination of extreme bureaucratic path dependence—such as 
the inherited practices of a large DA’s office—and otherwise 
correlated decisionmaking exercised by stakeholders at multiple sites 
of local discretion. 
1. Excluding Basic Causes.  What if the cause of concentration is 
benign? Perhaps what shows up as variation simply reflects differences 
in population or in the distribution of sufficiently culpable homicides. 
Such explanations, however, are inconsistent with the data here, and 
with what other studies reveal about the practice of capital punishment. 
a. Population.  Justice Breyer’s Glossip dissent focuses on the 
number of counties that impose death sentences,64 which invites the 
objection that those counties nonetheless house a considerable fraction 
of the population. HOI, however, exposes the limits of that objection. 
Nationally, the fraction of the population in counties accounting for 
half of the country’s death sentences has fallen from 24 percent to 14 
 
 62. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.  
 63. The Western proposition that like phenomena should be treated the same way dates 
back at least to Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 267–69 (H. Rackham 
trans., Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 2014) (c. 350 B.C.E.); ARISTOTLE, MAGNA MORALIA, in 
METAPHYSICS X–XIV, OECONOMICA, AND MAGNA MORALIA bk. I, at 533–43 (G. Cyril 
Armstrong ed., Hugh Tredennick trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1935) (c. 350 B.C.E.). 
 64. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2761 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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percent.65 For executions, the number has increased from 7 to 8 
percent.66 Moreover, HOI has dropped sharply within each of the five 
states with the most capital sentences.67 The only reported HOI results 
in which the relationship to population is ambiguous are for executions 
in Oklahoma, Missouri, and Florida.68 In short, the data corroborate 
the intuition—capital punishment is practiced by a diminishing 
minority of Americans, both nationally and (generally) within capitally 
active states. 
b. Homicides.  Another benign explanation for capital-outcome 
concentration is that the data disclose comparatively proportional 
punishment because they track the distribution of culpable homicides. 
Notwithstanding that some empirical studies of death penalty states 
report modest county-level correlation between homicide rates and the 
number of inmates actually sitting on death row,69 the idea that 
concentration is tracking culpability remains farfetched. 
First, as a purely logical matter, that homicides correlate positively 
with death sentences does not mean that a geographic distribution of 
capital events looks anything like a geographic distribution of similar 
offense–offender combinations.70 Time after time, studies have shown 
that the ratio of death sentences to homicides can vary substantially 
between materially similar counties in the same state jurisdiction.71 
 
 65. See supra Table 3. 
 66. See supra Table 3. 
 67. See supra Table 4. 
 68. See supra Table 5.  
 69. See, e.g., John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in 
the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 822 (2005) (noting that “causation may run from 
homicides to executions”); Eisenberg, supra note 38, at 354–55 (“In short, consistent with state-
level findings, the number of murders in a geographical unit (the county) is likely the single most 
influential factor determining the number of persons on death row due to murders in the unit.”). 
 70. A homicide, death sentence, and execution would almost always happen in different 
years. See, e.g., Offenders on Death Row, TEX. DEP’T CRIMINAL JUSTICE, https://www.tdcj.state.
tx.us/death_row/dr_offenders_on_dr.html [https://perma.cc/N97W-YDP4] (displaying pertinent 
homicide and death sentence data for offenders on Texas’s death row). 
 71. See DAVID C. BALDUS, CHARLES A. PULASKI & GEORGE G. WOODWORTH, EQUAL 
JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 121, 128 (1990); SAMUEL L. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, 
DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 64–65 (1984); 
RAYMOND PATERNOSTER & ROBERT BRAME, AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MARYLAND’S 
DEATH SENTENCING SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO THE INFLUENCE OF RACE AND LEGAL 
JURISDICTION 26 (2003), http://www.aclu-md.org/uploaded_files/0000/0377/md_death_penalty_
race_study.pdf [https://perma.cc/YYQ7-274Q]; William J. Bowers, The Pervasiveness of 
Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 74 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1067, 1067–1100 (1983); William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrariness and 
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Second, the distribution of capital sentences lacks substantial 
geographic correspondence with homicides. I performed a simple 
analysis of the relationship between capital sentences and homicides, 
which I reported in Table 8. I looked at the counties that were 
responsible for half of a jurisdiction’s capital sentences and, using 
homicide data from the CDC,72 computed the fraction of the 
jurisdiction’s homicides occurring in those same counties. Ideally, half 
of a jurisdiction’s death sentences should correspond with half of its 
homicides.73 Nationally, however, the fraction of homicides associated 
with half of American death sentences fell from 36 percent during 
period 1 to 18 percent during period 4. Within capitally active states, 
the same trend line is usually downward sloping, although it is more 
gradual and there are some outliers.74 Those outliers notwithstanding, 
the basic insight is obvious enough: the concentration of capital 
punishment does not correspond to the distribution of homicides. 
These results confirm more rigorous regression analysis of data across 
local jurisdictions within individual states, which show that capital-
sentencing patterns do not reflect the types of homicides committed in 
the different localities.75 
 
Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 563, 604 tbl.5 
(1980); John J. Donohue III, An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty System 
Since 1973: Are There Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities?, 4 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 637, 650 (2014); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Part II: Report to the ALI 
Concerning Capital Punishment, 89 TEX. L. REV. 367, 390 (2010). 
 72. See supra note 24. 
 73. I computed this value for death sentences rather than executions because, as between 
the two, the evidence that there is some correlation between homicides and death sentences is 
much stronger. See infra note 79. 
 74. The figure fell over three percentage points in California, over four points in Texas, 
almost thirteen points in Florida, sixteen points in Alabama, and almost twenty-eight points in 
North Carolina. See supra Table 8. 
 75. See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 71, at 673 (“Indeed, the most consistent and undisputed 
finding in all the regression analyses of Connecticut data by both experts is that the single most 
important influence from 1973–2007 explaining whether a death-eligible defendant would be 
sentenced to death was whether the crime occurred in Waterbury.”); PATERNOSTER & BRAME, 
supra note 71, at 31 (“In other words, differences in how different [Maryland] jurisdictions handle 
death eligible cases cannot be attributed to the kinds of homicides committed in those 
jurisdictions.”); Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Impact of Legally Inappropriate 
Factors on Death Sentencing for California Homicides, 1990–1999, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 
38 (2005) (“The data also show geographic variations in rates of death sentencing [in California]. 
Excluding counties with smaller populations, death sentencing rates vary from roughly .005% of 
all homicides to rates five times higher.”); Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Race, Region, 
and Death Sentencing in Illinois, 1988–1997, 81 OR. L. REV. 39, 67 (2002) (“Indicators of two 
extra-legal factors, the race of first-degree murder victims and geographic region, were found 
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Third, the distribution of executions also maps poorly onto the 
distribution of homicides.76 Almost 40 percent of American homicides 
are in counties that have not executed anyone since Furman.77 The 
twenty most capitally active counties account for 35 percent of 
American executions, but just 12 percent of its homicides.78 
Fourth, showing that capital outcomes track the distribution of 
homicides requires proof of more than correspondence between static 
maps of each. Unless the change in capital-outcome distribution 
corresponds to a change in homicide distribution—which even a 
superficial view of the data excludes79—the latter cannot explain the 
former. 
2. Excluding Differentiated Punishment Norms.  In some ways, 
every county has its own story, and I generalize at my own peril. 
Political units experiencing concentration nonetheless have certain 
attributes in common, including the sets of local stakeholders that 
influence outcomes. The accumulated decisionmaking of each 
stakeholder set both reflects and produces what I call local muscle 
memory: the correlated exercise of local discretion. If concentration is 
indeed the result of the bureaucratic inertia and path dependence that 
mark muscle memory, then outcome irregularity cannot, as some might 
argue, be justified as a reflection of locally differentiated punishment 
norms. 
Understanding muscle memory requires familiarity with the local 
stakeholders themselves—and, more importantly, why their 
decisionmaking outcomes might correlate. Any modern capital event 
is the result of a local crime. The response to local crime is meted out 
largely through the discretionary practice of local police, prosecutors, 
defense attorneys, juries, and judges. Stakeholders have discretion that 
substantially affects capital outcomes, and certain discretionary 
 
statistically related to the imposition of the death sentence in Illinois controlling on the other 
variables in this study.”).  
 76. See Frank R. Baumgartner, Woody Gram, Kaneesha R. Johnson, Arvind Krishnamurthy 
& Colin P. Wilson, The Geographic Distribution of US Executions, 11 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1, 10–15 (2016). 
 77. See id. at 10. 
 78. See id. 
 79. However, because I do not formally analyze the longitudinal effect of local changes in 
homicide volume on local changes in capital process, my data does not itself disprove the 
correspondence. I can claim only that such a correspondence is extraordinarily unlikely. It is 
worth noting that, even at the national level, there seems to be no longitudinal correlation 
between homicides and executions. See Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 69, at 836. 
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decisions tend to correlate with others. That correlation, in turn, 
produces sustained capital activity in some large localities and 
abstention in many others. 
The first coercive exercise of state power in the capital-
punishment sequence is an arrest executed by local law enforcement, 
usually following an investigation. The idea that policing involves 
considerable discretion needs little discussion,80 and such discretion can 
suppress the relationship between culpability and punishment. For 
example, local policing practice certainly plays a role in the well-
documented phenomenon that the death penalty is used 
disproportionately to punish offenders who kill white victims.81 Police 
tend to more strongly support the death penalty,82 and police unions 
can have considerable political clout—influence that is most visibly 
reflected in the especially harsh punishment for killing a law 
enforcement officer.83 Influential police unions are disproportionally 
present in large localities,84 and such presence correlates with that of 
larger prosecutors’ offices that most aggressively and efficaciously seek 
capital sentences.85 
Indeed, perhaps the greatest (if not most visible) source of local 
variation is the discretion of the local prosecutor, which is more 
appropriately described as the correlated discretion exercised within 
the local prosecutor’s office. (A locally elected DA usually leads that 
office.86) The prosecutor investigates the crime, decides whether to 
capitally indict the defendant, negotiates any plea, performs jury 
selection, tries both the guilt and sentencing phases of a case for the 
state, conducts much of the state’s postconviction litigation, and—in 
some jurisdictions—seeks the death warrant that formally initiates the 
countdown to an execution.87 
 
 80. See David M. Jaros, Preempting the Police, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1149, 1149 (2014). 
 81. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287 (1987) (citing the famous “Baldus study”). 
 82. See DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN 
AGE OF ABOLITION 289 (2010) (“In American death penalty politics, among the most reliable 
and active supporters of capital punishment are police officers, prison guards, and local district 
attorneys.”). 
 83. See id. at 289 (“Police union officials demand death sentences for ‘cop killers’ and regard 
the issue as a test of any politician’s support.”). 
 84. See JOHN S. DEMPSEY & LINDA S. FORST, AN INTRODUCTION TO POLICING 91 (2013). 
 85. See infra notes 86–93 and accompanying text. 
 86. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 
533 (2001) (“The large majority of local district attorneys are elected.”). 
 87. See generally ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
PROSECUTOR (2007) (exploring the discretion vested in prosecutors’ offices).  
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Multiple studies confirm that prosecutorial discretion has an 
extremely substantial effect on the pattern of capital charging within a 
state.88 For example, larger prosecutor’s offices benefit from 
economies of scale in selecting juries—that is, the cost of “death 
qualifying” a jury (defined below) goes down as the office accumulates 
experience. Effective capital prosecution necessitates overhead and 
experience available only in larger localities with better-funded 
offices,89 which is one reason why capital outcomes tend to cluster 
there.90 Judges and prosecutors face similar electorates,91 and capitally 
inclined prosecutors dominate in those same large localities that house 
strong police unions. The discretion lodged in a DA’s office combines 
with the political economy of crime control to account for the 
phenomenon that, when there are more elections in certain localities, 
there is more capital punishment.92 When local prosecutors make all of 
these decisions in different bureaucratic ecosystems, the result is an 
irregular distribution of capital outcomes.93 
The prosecutors, however, are only half of the adversarial 
equation. An underappreciated (but less correlated) source of local 
variation is the bureaucratic configuration of capital defense. Some 
localities use underfunded county public defenders94 or panels of 
 
 88. See BARRY NAKELL & KENNETH A. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY 125–30 (1987) (North Carolina); PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 71, at 26–31, 37–
39 (Maryland); Leigh B. Bienan, Neil Alan Weiner, Deborah W. Denno, Paul D. Allison & 
Douglas Lane Mills, The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 27, 178–84 (1988) (New Jersey); Bowers, supra 
note 71, at 1079 (Florida); Donohue, supra note 71, at 673 (Connecticut); Raymond Paternoster, 
Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 
74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754, 779–80 (1979) (South Carolina). 
 89. See Roger A. Fairfax Jr., Outsourcing Criminal Prosecution?: The Limits of Criminal 
Justice Privatization, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 265, 282 (“Jurisdictions with relatively small 
populations may not have the tax base to support a public prosecutor.”). 
 90. See supra Table 6. 
 91. Markus Dirk Dubber, The Victim in American Penal Law: A Systematic Overview, 3 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 20 (1999). 
 92. For sources discussing correlation between elections and judicial discretion in favor of 
death sentences, see Jeffrey D. Kubik & John R. Moran, Lethal Elections: Gubernatorial Politics 
and the Timing of Executions, 46 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3 (2003); Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court 
and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 283, 307–08 (2008); sources cited infra note 106. 
 93. See, e.g., John G. Douglass, Death as a Bargaining Chip: Plea Bargaining and the Future 
of Virginia’s Death Penalty, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 873, 874 (2015) (explaining the phenomenon in 
Virginia). 
 94. See Smith, supra note 92, at 304 (“The fees for court-appointed cases are usually capped 
[by the legislature], often at unrealistically low levels that cannot be waived by trial judges. Low 
fees can have adverse selection effects, leading the best-qualified defense attorneys to opt out of 
the system in favor of more remunerative cases.”). 
KOVARSKY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2016  10:06 AM 
292  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:259 
private counsel,95 but regional capital defender offices dramatically 
improve outcomes.96 Many states do not even have a public defender’s 
office accountable for state postconviction litigation,97 and the inmate 
representation at that phase of capital litigation is frequently quite 
poor.98 Some localities will pull lawyers from a rotating panel of 
nonspecialists, although luckier inmates might be represented by a 
government-funded postconviction office, such as a capital habeas unit 
(CHU).99 Gaps in representation are filled by nonprofit organizations 
or by firms doing pro bono work.100 In short, the geographic 
distribution of capital outcomes is influenced heavily by bureaucratic 
decisions about how to staff capital litigation on behalf of the 
condemned.101 
In addition to the police and the lawyers, judges fulfill a crucial 
role in the local administration of capital process. The local judge 
obviously presides over all pretrial motions and the trial itself. For 
decades, some judges exercised state power to “override” a life 
sentence and impose what that judge viewed as a more appropriate 
death penalty.102 (After Hurst v. Florida,103 however, state power to vest 
judges with such authority is in doubt.104) The local judge is also the 
trial-level judge in the state postconviction proceeding and, in many 
 
 95. Robert E. Stein, Public Defenders, 39 HUM. RTS. 25, 26 (2013). 
 96. See Jennifer E. Laurin, Gideon by the Numbers: The Emergence of Evidence-Based 
Practice in Indigent Defense, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 325, 346–48 (2015) (noting that a study of 
the Wichita Public Defender demonstrated that “public defenders provided more services to 
clients and obtained more dismissals at lower per-case cost than private assigned counsel in 
comparable cases”). 
 97. Nancy J. King, Enforcing Effective Assistance After Martinez, 122 YALE L.J. 2428, 2442–
43 (2013). 
 98. See Jordan M. Steiker, Improving Representation in Capital Cases: Establishing the Right 
Baselines in Federal Habeas to Promote Structural Reform Within States, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 293, 
294 (2007) (“[D]eficient trial representation is often followed and compounded by equally poor 
representation in state-post-conviction.”). 
 99. See generally Lugo v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 750 F.3d 1198, 1215 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(discussing the effect of CHUs on the quality of capital litigation). 
 100. See Carol S. Steiker, Raising the Bar: Maples v. Thomas and the Sixth Amendment Right 
to Counsel, 127 HARV. L. REV. 468, 470 (2013). 
 101. Unlike some of the other correlated features of muscle memory, there appears to be little 
data confirming or disproving how the presence of a public or quasi-public defense entity 
correlates with behavior of other local stakeholders. 
 102. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West 2015). 
 103. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
 104. See id. at 621 (holding that Florida’s capital-sentencing system, in which juries provided 
“advisory” verdicts and judges actually decided on the sentence, was unconstitutional). 
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jurisdictions, decides whether to issue the death warrant.105 As is the 
case with elected prosecutors, political cycles distort the ways in which 
elected judges exercise their considerable discretion.106 Moreover, 
because local judges frequently face the same electorates as 
prosecutors, the two sets of officials can be subject to a correlated 
political distortion. 
The local institutional practice that is most superficially 
inconsistent with the idea of muscle memory is jury deliberation. The 
jury is generally considered the most legitimate source of local 
variation, regarded as a normatively acceptable proxy for community 
preference.107 Under the Sixth Amendment, juries must be drawn from 
the community in which the crime was committed and the offender is 
tried.108 The jury formally considers the offense at the guilt phase and 
offender culpability at the punishment phase. The Constitution 
requires that juries be able to consider and give effect to any evidence 
that mitigates the defendant’s culpability,109 so the punishment phase 
frequently becomes a forum for the local jury to hear about the 
circumstances of the defendant’s upbringing, as well as any mental 
health issues or trauma. Particularly at the sentencing phase, the jury 
becomes an important surrogate for the locality’s punishment norms. 
Indeed, the jury is usually presented as a singular legitimizing force in 
the administration of capital punishment, a black box of twelve into 
which any number of institutional biases disappear or otherwise gain 
immunity from more exacting legal scrutiny. 
There are a number of reasons to be skeptical of the claim that 
juries disrupt—rather than aggravate—the correlated decisionmaking 
of local muscle memory. The first reason is that such a function is 
inconsistent with the data. Local variation in capital-outcome intensity 
 
 105. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 546.710 (West 2002); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 
43.141 (West 2006). But see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.218 (West 2016) (vesting power in the 
state supreme court and governor). 
 106. See Paul Brace & Brent D. Boyea, State Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the 
Practice of Electing Judges, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 360, 370–71 (2008) (“[E]lections and strong public 
opinion exert a notable and significant direct influence on judge decision making in [capital] 
cases.”); Dan Levine & Kristina Cooke, Uneven Justice: In States with Elected High Court Judges, 
a Harder Line on Capital Punishment, REUTERS (Sept. 22, 2015, 2:00 PM), http://www.reuters. 
com/investigates/special-report/usa-deathpenalty-judges [https://perma.cc/FKK4-5KEY]. 
 107. See Jenny Carroll, The Jury as Democracy, 66 ALA. L. REV. 825, 830–35 (2015) (“In the 
process, and in the context of the case before it, the jury offers an opportunity for the people to 
ensure that the law reflects their own values and expectations.”). 
 108. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 109. See infra note 220 and accompanying text. 
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is simply enormous, and the jury pools would have to have implausibly 
divergent assessments of culpability to justify the pattern. More 
importantly, the data disclose not just substantial variation, but 
substantial variation among counties that are similar and close 
together.110 The idea that juries in Houston and San Francisco might 
represent a dramatically different set of preferences is one thing; the 
idea that the same can be said of juries in Houston and Dallas is 
another.111 The jury-based explanation is also difficult to reconcile with 
the execution-concentration data. Juries have no role in securing a 
death warrant. If capital-outcome concentration reflects differentiated 
community views about punishment, then the sentencing and 
execution distributions should resemble one another. 
There are also structural reasons to reject the idea that the local 
jury constrains local muscle memory. The capital jury is a poor 
institutional mechanism for translating a community’s punishment 
preferences because of the idiosyncratic way that petit jurors are 
selected. Specifically, prosecutors may have the court dismiss members 
of the venire (the jury pool) who have philosophical reservations about 
imposing the death penalty—a practice known as “death qualifying” 
the jury.112 Larger prosecutor’s offices benefit substantially from prior 
experience with death qualification, which involves skillful questioning 
of the venire and judicious use of “strikes” against individual jurors. A 
death-qualified jury excludes precisely the people who are most likely 
to vote in favor of an acquittal or against a capital sentence.113 By 
definition, those juries fail to transmit the punishment norms that are 
most inconsistent with capital sentencing. Death qualification results in 
a not-terribly-representative petit jury uniquely disposed to convict 
and capitally sentence inmates,114 a circumstance making the 
 
 110. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 71, at 390–91 (“[The] simple facts of institutional 
organization generate enormous geographic disparities within most death penalty jurisdictions.”). 
 111. See id. at 391 (“[G]eographic disparities are troubling . . . because they suggest that state 
death penalty legislation is unable to standardize the considerations that are brought to bear in 
capital prosecutions so as to limit major fluctuations in its application across the state.”). 
 112. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 165 (1986). 
 113. See James R.P. Ogloff & Sonia R. Chopra, Stuck in the Dark Ages: Supreme Court 
Decisionmaking and Legal Developments, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 379, 391 (2004) 
(“[D]eath-qualified juries may be more disposed toward guilty verdicts than juries that include 
[death penalty opponents] because jurors who are not opposed to the death penalty may be more 
generally conviction prone than [death penalty opponents].” (citing Claudia L. Cowan, William 
C. Thompson & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors’ Predisposition 
to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1984))). 
 114. See id. 
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prosecutor’s discretionary charging decision even more influential. 
Consistent with the idea of local correlation, the larger communities 
containing more jurors with disqualifying scruples are precisely those 
communities in which prosecutors with the most resources are best 
equipped to disqualify them.115 
Local muscle memory is transmitted through established electoral 
strategies in local primaries and general elections,116 through the 
informal practices of individual prosecutors and local DA’s offices,117 
and through local norms of judicial process touching all phases of 
capital litigation. In certain localities, capital litigation can represent a 
source of political and professional opportunity for the police, 
prosecutors, judges, and executives that collectively perform the law 
enforcement function.118 In those localities, the bureaucracy is simply 
good at capital process.119 To phrase my explanation in the cold 
economic terms necessary for maximum clarity—if a capital outcome 
is an asset, localities that produce many death sentences and executions 
do so because of heavy political demand and cheap bureaucratic 
supply. 
There are other data that support a muscle-memory hypothesis. 
Political scientist Frank Baumgartner has observed that the extreme 
distribution of executions across U.S. counties corresponds to what 
statisticians call a “power law.”120 A power law is an irregular frequency 
distribution for which, when measuring on the y-axis for the frequency 
of observations having some x-axis value c, very large values of c are 
 
 115. One reason why cities might house a higher fraction of disqualified jurors is the 
substantial difference in attitudes about the death penalty between white and nonwhite 
communities. See J. Thomas Sullivan, The Demographic Dilemma in Death Qualification of 
Capital Jurors, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1107, 1134 (2014). 
 116. See Owen G. Abbe & Paul S. Herrnson, How Judicial Election Campaigns Have 
Changed, 85 JUDICATURE 286, 295 (2002). 
 117. See Leonard R. Mellon, Joan E. Jacoby & Marion A. Brewer, The Prosecutor 
Constrained by His Environment: A New Look at Discretionary Justice in the United States, 72 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 52, 53, 59–80 (1981); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black 
Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 178 (2008); William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion 
in the United States: The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 
54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1345 (1993). 
 118. See GARLAND, supra note 82, at 287–93. 
 119. See David R. Dow, Why Texas Is So Good at the Death Penalty, POLITICO (May 15, 
2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/05/texas-death-penalty-106736 [https:// 
perma.cc/J4WX-C4QU]; infra notes 120–24 and accompanying text. 
 120. See Frank R. Baumgartner, A Power-Law of Death, GEORGETOWN PUB. POL’Y INST. 
(Mar. 26, 2012), https://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/Innocence/Baumgartner-Power-Law-of-Death-
gtown.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z663-6FNH]. 
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unusually likely to occur.121 A bit more simply, if a power law describes 
a distribution, then the odds of observing freakishly large c values are 
high.122 Normal distributions dominate the natural sciences, but power 
laws appear often in contexts in which the frequency of measured 
phenomena reflect correlated decisionmaking.123 Specifically, power-
law distributions have thick tails due to self-reinforcing feedback 
effects. 
The execution data likely fit Baumgartner’s power law because 
the execution data are showing precisely the behavior that is producing 
the concentration evident in my metrics.124 Local variation in 
retributive norms cannot explain the local variation in capital 
activity.125 The self-reinforcing quality of the feedback explains not just 
why capital outcomes are concentrated, but why they are concentrating. 
Counties that have not practiced capital punishment in the past tend 
not to practice it in the future, and capitally active localities exhibit 
precisely the opposite tendency. Capital activity breeds more capital 
activity, and abstention breeds abstention. Self-reinforcement accounts 
for the extreme and accelerating concentration documented in Part I, 
and it is the local muscle memory to which I allude in this Article. 
B. The Weak Consequentialist Justification 
A comprehensive normative analysis of death sentencing and 
execution patterns is difficult without a granular understanding of why 
activity is rising or falling in each locality. My ambition is more modest. 
My inquiry is focused on excluding broad explanations for a set of 
observations, however, so extreme granularity is unnecessary. I am 
comfortable analyzing generally the consequentialist and retributivist 
justifications for the death penalty, in light of the basic assumptions 
about local path dependence and bureaucratic inertia articulated 
above. 
The first of the two major penological theories invoked to support 
capital punishment is consequentialism, under which justification 
 
 121. DAVID EASLEY & JON KLEINBERG, NETWORKS, CROWDS, AND MARKETS: 
REASONING ABOUT A HIGHLY CONNECTED WORLD 479–81 (2010). 
 122. See Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and 
Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145, 147 (2003). 
 123. See EASLEY & KLEINBERG, supra note 121, at 479, 482. 
 124. In fact, the power law was first observed in an attempt to understand income 
concentration. See Thomas Bak, Power-Law Distributions and the Federal Judiciary, 46 
JURIMETRICS J. 139, 140 n.3 (2006). 
 125. See RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 169–78 (1991). 
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follows from costs and benefits materializing in the real world.126 
Consequentialism does not prioritize equal punishment per se; equality 
has only instrumental importance.127 The major consequentialist 
accounts of capital punishment focus on deterrent effects,128 and so I 
begin there. 
The idea that capital-outcome concentration increases deterrence 
is either empirically untested or untestable. There is some meaningful 
empirical work on the deterrent effect of capital outcomes generally, 
although both the existence and intensity of that effect remain in 
serious doubt.129 There is no empirical work whatsoever on the effect 
 
 126. See David O. Brink, Utilitarian Morality and the Personal Point of View, 83 J. PHIL. 417, 
420 (1986). 
 127. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 23 (rev. ed. 1999) (noting that distributive 
considerations are of instrumental importance to utilitarians). 
 128. See infra notes 129, 131 and accompanying text. 
 129. The empirical dispute is well known. Before 1975, the deterrent studies employed one of 
three matching techniques: comparing contemporaneous homicide rates of nearby states, 
comparing homicide rates during periods of capital activity and inactivity, and comparing 
homicide trends before and after high-profile capital events. See ROBERT M. BOHM, 
DEATHQUEST: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
IN THE UNITED STATES 85–88 (1999) (collecting studies). The most prominent were performed 
by sociologist Thorsten Sellin, who compared homicide rates in contiguous states between 1920 
and 1963. See Thorsten Sellin, Homicides in Retentionist and Abolitionist States, in CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 135, 135–38 (1967). No study using such methods disclosed a deterrent effect. See 
id. at 88. In 1975, economist Isaac Ehrlich published the first study finding a deterrent effect, using 
multivariate regression analysis of data from 1933 to 1969 to report that each execution deterred 
somewhere between seven to eight homicides. See generally Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect 
of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975). Ehrlich 
argued that prior methods had used proxies for statistical controls that were incapable of allowing 
anyone to isolate a deterrent effect. See id. at 398. Ehrlich’s analysis subsequently came under fire 
for, among other things: having insufficiently controlled for important variables, having 
insufficiently recognized the need to compare the deterrent effect of the death penalty with the 
next-most severe punishment (life without parole), and having failed to disclose that the effect 
disappeared without the last five years of data in the sample. See BOHM, supra, at 89 (discussing 
failure to compare to life-without-parole); David C. Baldus & James W.L. Cole, A Comparison 
of the Work of Thorsten Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 
YALE L.J. 170, 180 (1975) (discussing insufficient controls); Peter Passell & John B. Taylor, The 
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Another View, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 445, 445 (1977) 
(concluding that the final five years of Ehrlich’s dataset distorted his general conclusions). In 1978, 
the National Academy of Sciences issued a report fiercely criticizing Ehrlich’s methods and 
conclusions. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE 
EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES (Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen & 
Daniel Nagin eds., 1978). There has been a recent surge in empirical work that is less critical of 
Ehrlich’s conclusions, although that work has failed to convince many observers that the death 
penalty’s effect on the homicide rate can be reliably isolated. See Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 
69, at 793 n.11 (collecting newer studies); id. at 794 (“Our estimates suggest not just ‘reasonable 
doubt’ about whether there is any deterrent effect of the death penalty, but profound 
uncertainty.”). 
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of geographic irregularities on deterrence, and the ability to measure 
deterrent effect with such granularity seems far beyond the existing 
capacity of anybody in the field. 
One could nonetheless hazard a guess as to how a consequentialist 
might support capital-outcome concentration. First, concentration 
might produce nondeterrence benefits. Second, the production of 
geographically concentrated capital outcomes may simply be less 
expensive than the dispersed alternative. 
1. Non-Deterrence Rationales.  For reasons that may already be 
apparent, I prefer the term “consequentialism” to “deterrence.” 
Although death penalty discourse frequently positions “deterrence” as 
the normative foil for the deontological concept of “retribution,”130 
deterrence is merely a central benefit in the consequentialist 
justification of capital punishment.131 Moreover, and contrary to 
popular usage, consequentialism is not synonymous with a utilitarian 
preference for maximizing the hedonic surplus of pleasure over pain;132 
utilitarianism is simply a type of consequentialism.133 Consequentialist 
paradigms require a comparison of benefits and costs, however those 
are measured.134 
On the benefit side, the emphasis on deterrence is underinclusive. 
A capital sanction achieves the maximum conceivable incapacitation, 
and incapacitation—along with deterrence and reformation—is a 
broadly recognized means of crime prevention.135 More importantly, 
however, the death penalty might conceivably have two aspects of what 
I call a “satisfaction benefit,” which do not involve crime prevention at 
all.136 First, capital outcomes are a source of vindictive utility for a 
 
 130. See Claire Finkelstein, A Contractarian Argument Against the Death Penalty, 81 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1283, 1307 (2006). 
 131. See Russell L. Christopher, Death Delayed Is Retribution Denied, 99 MINN. L. REV. 421, 
435 (2014). 
 132. See Eric R. Claeys, Virtue and Rights in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
889, 896 (2009). 
 133. See Eyal Zamir & Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and Economics: Integrating Moral 
Constraints with Economic Analysis of Law, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 329 (2008). 
 134. See id. at 371. 
 135. See Aaron J. Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The Philosophical Premises of 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557, 568 (2003). 
 136. Cf. PRIMORATZ, supra note 60, at 21–22 (using the term “vindictive satisfaction” to 
describe the first of the two phenomena I specify). 
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victim’s community—including the victim’s family.137 Second, the 
death penalty might be loss-aversive insofar as it avoids the social costs 
associated with extralegal means of securing community satisfaction, 
such as private revenge, vigilantism, or lynching.138 
The concept of a satisfaction benefit is central to at least one 
consequentialist theory that concentrated capital outcomes perform a 
meaningful function. Capital outcomes could be concentrating in 
communities for which both aspects of the satisfaction benefit are 
highest. All other things being equal, if states impose and carry out 
death sentences in the local communities that derive the greatest 
vindictive utility from such practices, then concentration is less 
consequentially problematic.139 Moreover, if the communities in which 
capital outcomes concentrate are especially prone to extralegal means 
of satisfaction, then those outcomes displace something else quite 
costly. Indeed, there is some reason to believe that the most capitally 
active localities are those in which (1) communities derive the most 
vindictive utility from that activity, and (2) the death penalty displaces 
a more harmful community response.140 The muscle-memory 
phenomenon complicates the vindictive satisfaction story 
considerably, however, because capital activity levels may not 
correspond strongly with community punishment preferences. 
 
 137. See Marie Gottschalk, Dismantling the Carceral State: The Future of Penal Policy Reform, 
84 TEX. L. REV. 1693, 1734 (2006) (citing Michael L. Radelet & Marian J. Borg, The Changing 
Nature of Death Penalty Debates, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 43, 52 (2000)); Jack Greenberg, Against the 
American System of Capital Punishment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1670, 1677 n.39 (1986). 
 138. Justice Stewart alluded to this idea in his Furman concurrence. See Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).  
 139. This is a big “if.” Victims may not feel closure either because a death sentence is 
frequently imposed without a corresponding execution, or because, even when an execution 
happens, the feeling of relief may be less than anticipated. See generally Marilyn Peterson Armour 
& Mark S. Umbreit, Assessing the Impact of the Ultimate Penal Sanction on Homicide Survivors: 
A Two State Comparison, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (2012) (reporting empirical work on survivor 
experience). 
 140. There is some reason to believe that capitally active jurisdictions are disproportionately 
vulnerable to vigilantism and lynching. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF 
AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 89–90, 93, 96–98 (2003); see also Steven F. Messner, Eric P. 
Baumer & Richard Rosenfeld, Distrust of Government, the Vigilante Tradition, and Support for 
Capital Punishment, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 559, 579 (2006) (“In addition, the main effect of the 
vigilante tradition is significant . . . . [W]hites who reside in states where lynching was more 
prevalent . . . are significantly more likely than others to support the death penalty.”); Steven F. 
Messner, Robert D. Baller & Matthew P. Zevenbergen, The Legacy of Lynching and Southern 
Homicide, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 633, 634 (2005) (“[T]he legacy of lynching during this dark era of 
America’s past may help explain variation in the level of homicides within the South in more 
contemporary times.”). 
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A second consequentialist justification for capital-outcome 
concentration centers on cost.141 Concentration might be providing 
some sort of deterrence benefit by shifting outcomes from localities 
that produce capital events at high cost to localities that produce them 
less expensively. Local muscle memory provides less of a reason to be 
skeptical here, because the activity in high-volume jurisdictions 
probably does bespeak a morbid proficiency. I discussed the myriad 
local institutions that collectively produce capital outcomes in Part 
II.A.2, and suffice it to say that capital prosecutions, appeals, 
postconviction litigation, and incarceration are very expensive.142 
There are economies of scale in training prosecutors, educating judges, 
and preparing expert witnesses.143 If capital-outcome concentration can 
produce the same benefits at a lesser cost, then the migration of 
outcomes from costlier to less expensive localities represents a 
consequential benefit. 
2. Problems with Pure Consequentialist Rationales.  Aside from 
general skepticism about the premises of vindictive satisfaction,144 
there are at least two other serious problems with the pure 
consequentialist rationales. The first is a problem common to all pure 
consequentialist theories, and the second is unique to capital-outcome 
concentration. 
First, the sort of pure consequentialist account necessary to sustain 
extreme capital concentration runs into objections that have dogged 
the theory for years. The most famous is the Rawlsian “scapegoating 
objection” that consequentialism permits welfare-promoting 
punishment of innocent offenders.145 Capital-outcome concentration 
 
 141. See PRIMORATZ, supra note 60, at 37 (“Utilitarians would want punishments to be 
effective, but at a reasonable price.”). 
 142. See Public Policy Choices and Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Critical Review of 
New Evidence: Hearing on H.B. 3834 Before the Joint Comm. on Judiciary of Mass. Leg., 2005 
Leg., 184th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005) (statement of Jeffrey Fagan, Columbia Law School). 
 143. Cf. Dow, supra note 119 (explaining that Texas is proficient at executing people because 
it is experienced). 
 144. See supra note 139. 
 145. See Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and Punishment of the 
Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115, 123–27 (2000) (collecting canonical authority); Kyron Huigens, 
Dignity and Desert in Punishment Theory, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 33, 33–34 (2003) (“The 
scapegoating objection points out that if punishment is justified by deterrence, or by any other 
beneficial consequences, then a net gain in good consequences should be pursued regardless of 
traditional notions of guilt and desert.”); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 11 
(1955) (discussing the problems inherent in punishing an innocent offender for the best interests 
of society). Consequentialist theorists have long argued (with only limited success) that certain 
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does not necessarily entail punishment of innocent people and is 
therefore not formally vulnerable to the objection, but scapegoating is 
the extreme example of consequentialist insensitivity to 
blameworthiness. Capital-outcome concentration does trigger 
concerns about consequentialism’s tolerance for the related problem 
of exemplary punishment, in which the state imposes extreme penalties 
on a subset of offenders.146 Accepting a pure consequentialist 
justification for capital-outcome concentration means swallowing the 
proposition that the state may permissibly increase social welfare 
through a blame-insensitive distribution of punishment. Whatever 
feature of pure consequentialism that would justify concentration is 
likely the same feature that justifies tolerance for welfare-enhancing 
risk of wrongful executions. 
Second, a pure consequentialist case for capital-outcome 
concentration would necessitate a number of logical propositions that 
are empirically untested or untestable. For example, and as mentioned 
above, there are no data to support the proposition that concentrated 
capital outcomes produce meaningful increments of net general 
deterrence. Nested inside the marginal-deterrence premise is another 
assumption—that the death penalty has a deterrent effect as a general 
matter—and even that assumption is heavily disputed.147 
*   *   * 
There is some empirical evidence that capital events are 
concentrating in jurisdictions with greater indicia of vindictive 
satisfaction, so there may be something to a consequentialist 
justification.148 Although there are no data reporting the costs of 
producing capital events in different jurisdictions, the idea that 
experience increases proficiency and reduces cost is sufficiently 
 
versions of the paradigm preclude scapegoating. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 5 (1968) (describing as “definitional stop” the semantic practice of defining 
punishment of the innocent out of existence); T.L.S. Sprigge, A Utilitarian Reply to Dr. 
McCloskey, 8 INQUIRY 254, 275 (1965) (arguing that implausibility of scapegoating counsels 
against a prominent role in normative theory). 
 146. See PRIMORATZ, supra note 60, at 41; Andrew von Hirsch, Hybrid Principles in 
Allocating Sanctions: A Response to Professor Robinson, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 64, 65 (1987). 
 147. For a discussion of the history of the empirical dispute, see supra note 129. 
 148. See supra note 140; see also James S. Liebman & Peter Clarke, Minority Practice, 
Majority’s Burden: The Death Penalty Today, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 273 (2011) (positing a 
statistical relationship between capital sentencing and receptivity to the vigilante streak more 
prevalent among libertarian communities). 
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intuitive to resist out-of-hand dismissal. When combined with the 
vindictive utility benefit, the efficiency rationale could theoretically 
form a weak consequentialist case for capital-outcome concentration—
albeit one vulnerable to some of the most trenchant critiques of that 
penal theory. 
C. Retributivist Constraints 
History’s most famous retributivist is whoever declared that the 
punishment must fit the crime. Widely associated with Kant and 
Hegel,149 retributivism embodies the principle that punishment 
requites “desert.”150 Desert, in turn, is a function of a crime (offense) 
and a criminal’s culpability (offender).151 To the extent one rejects pure 
consequentialism—which virtually every modern penal practice 
does152—punishment must satisfy some retributive constraint on the 
state’s authority to penalize wrongdoing.153 Retributivist punishment 
theory mutes many of the normative objections hounding pure 
utilitarian models. A retributivist constraint, for example, bars a state 
from promoting social welfare by punishing innocent people or by 
imposing exemplary penalties.154 
Most strains of retributivism, in contrast to consequentialism, 
involve a thicker commitment to the idea that the state must impose 
comparable punishment on equally culpable offenders (comparative 
proportionality).155 Unless a theory either recognizes local punishment 
 
 149. See G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 101 at 129 (Allen W. 
Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991) (1821); IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN 
EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF 
RIGHT 195 (W. Hastie trans., 2002) (1797); cf. PRIMORATZ, supra note 60, at 13 (“The most 
important and influential among classical retributivists are Kant and Hegel.”). 
 150. See ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 363–65 (1983); Russell L. 
Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 
860 (2002); Michael Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 188, 
188 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 1998). 
 151. See supra note 150. 
 152. See infra note 161; cf. Christopher, supra note 131, at 476 (explaining that the 
“constitutionality of capital punishment relies primarily on retributivism”). 
 153. See Samuel W. Buell, Culpability and Modern Crime, 103 GEO. L.J. 547, 584 (2015); 
Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 683–
84 (2005). 
 154. See Kenneth W. Simons, On Equality, Bias Crimes, and Just Deserts, 91 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 237, 237 (2000). 
 155. See R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 156 (2001); C.L. 
TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 51 (1987); Dan 
Markel & Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive 
Justice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 907, 975 (2010); Michael S. Moore, The Independent Moral Significance 
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practice as constitutive of desert or permits localities to punish similar 
desert differently, irregular capital-outcome distribution will violate 
comparative-proportionality norms.156 Even such niche theories of 
local variation come up short, however, because local muscle memory 
is inconsistent with some key empirical assumptions they make to 
justify concentration. Faced with local variation that has little to do 
with differences in punishment norms, the only retributivist recourse is 
to sever any commitment to comparative proportionality, in which case 
the objection to capital-outcome concentration could simply be 
restated as a violation of a freestanding norm of penal equality.157 
1. The Negative Retributivist Constraint.  Pure retributivism has 
substantial problems. First, if penal theory exists as both an abstract 
justification for the institution of punishment and as a particularized 
set of rules for distributing it, retributivism is considerably better at the 
second job. Most would believe that societies have penal institutions to 
prevent wrongdoing, not to fulfill moral obligations.158 Second, the 
purest retributivist theories involve rules not just about when a state 
may punish, but when it must. For that reason, retributive theory is 
 
of Wrongdoing, 1994 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 237, 251; see also Russell L. Christopher, The 
Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Bargains and Punishments, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 131–32 (2003) 
(“Though not always articulated as an express tenet of retributivism, treating equally situated 
culpable wrongdoers equally is implicit in, or presupposed by, retributivism.”); George P. 
Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 51, 59 (1999) 
(“In view of the fact that all theories of justice are primarily concerned with equality, it makes 
sense to ground retributive justice as well in a commitment to bring about equality . . . among 
offenders.”); David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1619, 1620 n.3 (2010) 
(describing comparative proportionality as being “usually credited to retributivist theories of 
punishment”). Professor Ernest van den Haag, however, was a retributivist who spent his career 
disputing that justice had a distributive element. See William S. Laufer & Nien-hê Hsieh, 
Choosing Equal Injustice, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 343, 343–44 (2003) (summarizing van den Haag’s 
position and collecting sources). 
 156. I assume the retributivist theory also reaches the magnitude of the penalty, as the 
correlation between desert and the magnitude of punishment is a mainline premise of most 
retributivism. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
961, 1234–35 n.669 (2001) (collecting sources). 
 157. See Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 49–
50 (2010) (discussing the concept of equality and its fundamental importance in a just society). 
 158. “Rule utilitarianism” describes the cluster of theories under which utilitarianism 
provides the abstract justification for punishment, but leaves questions of distribution for another 
moral principle. See ROBERT CUNNINGHAM, SITUATIONISM AND THE NEW MORALITY 37 (1970) 
(defining rule utilitarianism); Rawls, supra note 145, at 10–13; see also Richard Brandt, Toward a 
Credible Form of Utilitarianism in Morality and the Language of Conduct, in ETHICS: THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 118, 121 (Manuel Velasquez & Cynthia Rostankowski eds., 1985) (specifying a 
set of rule utilitarian criteria). 
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vulnerable to criticism that it calls for excessive punishment even when 
it serves no broader social purpose.159 Finally, although most agree that 
desert turns on the gravity of the offense and the culpability of the 
offender, retributive theory lacks a satisfying normative account of 
how the state should schedule deserved punishment.160 Viewing 
retributivism as a mixed bag, many theorists favor synthetic models 
combining consequentialist and retributivist features—usually 
combinations in which consequentialism animates the purpose of 
punishment generally and retributivism limits its application in 
individual cases.161 The variation in synthetic theory is substantial,162 
and exploring it is largely (but not entirely) beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
The role of synthetic theory differs somewhat depending on 
whether the pertinent inquiry involves “positive” or “negative” 
retributivism. There exists an important theoretical distinction 
between the retributivist ideas that desert creates a state duty to impose 
punishment (positive retributivism) and that it creates a state right to 
do so (negative retributivism). The positive retributivist believes that 
desert morally obligates state punishment, and the negative 
retributivist believes that desert permits it.163 Under positive 
 
 159. See A.C. EWING, THE MORALITY OF PUNISHMENT WITH SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR A 
GENERAL THEORY OF ETHICS 18 (1929). 
 160. “Empirical desert” is a term generally associated with Professor Paul Robinson, and is 
an attempt to identify a community’s deserved-punishment schedule based on that community’s 
intuitions about wrongdoing and culpability. See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. 
DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 
(1995) (originating work on empirical desert). A true schedule of deontological desert may be 
unknowable, so Professor Robinson has argued that “empirical desert offers the best practical 
approximation of deontological desert.” See Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in 
Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089, 1110 (2011). 
 161. Three canonical synthetic theories have been advanced by A.M. Quinton, John Rawls, 
and H.L.A. Hart. See, e.g., HART, supra note 145, at 4–5 (arguing that deterrence sets the floor of 
the punishment range and that retribution sets the ceiling); PRIMORATZ, supra note 60, at 113–
14 (citing Quinton’s argument that consequentialism justifies punishment but that retributivism 
defines it); Rawls, supra note 145, at 7–12 (advocating that rule utilitarianism justifies punishing 
institutions, but that the institutions use retributivist rules).  
 162. For example, synthetic theories might differ on the underlying justification for using 
retributivism as the punishment distribution rule, or on what rule provides the lower punishment 
bound of a range. See Russell L. Christopher, Time and Punishment, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 269, 308 
(2005) (contrasting the justification for the lower punishment bound under different synthetic 
theories). 
 163. See MICHAEL T. CAHILL, Punishment Pluralism, in RETRIBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON 
THEORY AND POLICY 25, 36 (Mark D. White ed., 2011) (discussing negative retributivism); 
Kenneth W. Simons, Retributivism Refined—or Run Amok?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 551, 556–57 
(2010) (book review) (discussing arguments raised in LARRY ALEXANDER, KIMBERLY KESSLER 
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retributivism, desert sets not only the maximum bound for punishment, 
but also its minimum.164 
Capital-outcome concentration is maximally offensive to positive 
retributivism because positive retributivism corresponds with the most 
inflexible comparative-proportionality rules. The positive retributivist 
believes that punishment must be proportional to desert in any given 
case, and that the same scale of desert applies across offenders.165 These 
two premises combine to produce the comparative-proportionality 
principle: that similar offense-culpability combinations should trigger 
similar punishment. Similarly culpable offenses trigger similar 
punishment because society grades punishment on a shared scale of 
desert.166 It is precisely the positive retributivist’s enhanced 
commitment to comparative proportionality that makes capital-
outcome concentration so problematic. If two localities treat similar 
offenders differently, the asymmetry means either that the capitally 
active locality is punishing in excess of desert or that the capitally 
sluggish locality is ignoring it. Unless local variation in fact tracks 
desert or unless a synthetic theory permits different communities to 
punish different offense-culpability combinations differently—
possibilities I explore in Part II.C.2—capital-outcome concentration 
blatantly violates the central comparative-proportionality norm of 
positive retributivism. 
In part because positive retributivism represents an extraordinary 
resource commitment and because it requires punishment that 
promotes no social purpose, many prefer negative retributivism, in 
which desert dictates upper limits on punishment.167 Negative 
 
FERZAN, AND STEPHEN MORSE, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 7–9 
(2009)). 
 164. See Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the Social 
Psychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1422–23 n.156 (2003) (reviewing positive 
retributivism and its proponents). 
 165. See id. 
 166. The notion that just application of rules should render an independent equality rule 
redundant has been the subject of debate in the equality literature. See, e.g., Peter Westen, The 
Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 551 (1982) (“It is true that rules should be applied 
equally, consistently, and impartially, if by ‘equally,’ ‘consistently,’ and ‘impartially’ one means 
the tautological proposition that the rule should be applied in all cases to which the terms of the 
rule dictate that it be applied.”). 
 167. See Adam J. Kolber, Against Proportional Punishment, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1141, 1173 
(2013); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 
523 (1987); cf. Lawrence Crocker, The Upper Limit of Just Punishment, 41 EMORY L.J. 1059, 
1060–61 (1992) (developing a well-known negative retributivist position). 
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retributivism appears as a feature of synthetic theory,168 and constrains 
punishment with rules about when the state may punish, rather than 
rules about when it must. Negative retributivist constraints might be 
justified differently depending on the type of synthetic theory,169 but 
they all impose an upper bound on punishment that corresponds to 
desert.170 Theories about which offenders the state ought to select for 
punishment—how the state imposes punishment within the negatively 
bounded range—may be resolved by reference to some other theory, 
perhaps utilitarianism.171 (The need to incorporate a non-retributive 
justification accounts for the label “synthetic.”) The strongest 
normative objection to capital-outcome concentration would show that 
it violates a negative retributivist constraint, and I orient the balance 
of Part II accordingly. 
2. Retributivism and Local Muscle Memory.  The question at the 
heart of Part II is whether capital-outcome concentration might be 
consistent with a morally legitimate source of local variation. For 
capital-outcome concentration to satisfy a retributive constraint, two 
conditions must obtain. First, normative theory must produce some 
morally acceptable reason for locally differentiated treatment of 
similar offense–offender combinations. Second, the empirical 
conditions producing the local variation must approximate those that 
the theory assumes. 
There are at least three scenarios under which the geographic 
pattern in the capital-outcome data satisfies the first condition—a 
normatively acceptable source of local variation in the treatment of 
similar offense–offender combinations. First, the distribution of capital 
outcomes might track the distribution of desert because it reflects the 
distribution of culpable homicides (the “basic desert-correspondence” 
account). Second, it might track desert because local preferences can 
be constitutive of desert (“modified desert correspondence”). Third, 
the distribution might reflect the fact that different localities simply 
 
 168. See Christopher, supra note 162, at 292; Anthony M. Dillof, Modal Retributivism: A 
Theory of Sanctions for Attempts and Other Criminal Wrongs, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 647, 672 
(2011). 
 169. See PRIMORATZ, supra note 60, at 140–41 (comparing retributive-constraint 
justifications for theories by A.M. Quinton, A.C. Ewing, R.M. Hare, and H.L.A. Hart). 
 170. See Kolber, supra note 167, at 1147. 
 171. See, e.g., NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 167 (1982) (“In the fine-
tuning of punishment between the upper and lower limits of retributively deserved 
punishment . . . utilitarian values should apply.”). 
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punish the same levels of desert differently (“noncorrespondence”).172 
Each of these accounts, however, fails to satisfy the second condition 
insofar as they are excluded by the role of muscle memory. Whatever 
legitimate local variation one can squeeze out of retributive theory, the 
considerable influence of muscle memory means that the 
circumstances that might justify such variation are not plausible 
accounts of what is actually happening. 
With respect to the basic desert-correspondence account and as 
explained in Part II.A.1, whatever drives the geographic distribution of 
death sentences and executions, it is not the distribution of sufficiently 
blameworthy homicides. The geographic distribution of capital 
outcomes may nonetheless be retributively unobjectionable under a 
modified desert-correspondence or a noncorrespondence account. 
Those two “local variation” accounts fare better than does basic desert-
correspondence. I discuss the two local variation accounts together 
because each is potentially consistent with negative retributivism—if 
local practice unfolds in a way that permissibly translates retributive 
norms into punishment practice. 
Local variation is not a phenomenon that retributivists embrace 
comfortably,173 and its moral acceptability depends on the provenance 
of the retributive constraint. If retributivist constraints are essentially 
political principles derived from the relationship between the 
individual and the state, then those constraints should not be 
geographically differentiated.174 If, on the other hand, retributive 
norms flow from the accumulated practice of private blaming—when 
one person blames another for harm or wrongdoing—then some local 
variation might be normatively acceptable.175 
Local variation accounts, however, are not entirely foreign to 
retributive theory. For example, local variation could fit neatly within 
theories that retribution has communicative and expressive functions 
that must vary with respect to the entities doing the communicating 
and expressing. Under this strain of retributivist theory, punishment is 
a “retributive moment” during which the state communicates 
 
 172. The noncorrespondence account still has a commitment to comparative proportionality, 
but that commitment is only within the local jurisdiction. But the persistence of the 
intrajurisdictional commitment is what distinguishes noncorrespondence from retributivist 
accounts that sever comparative-proportionality norms entirely. 
 173. See Kenneth W. Simons, The Relevance of Community Values to Just Deserts: Criminal 
Law, Punishment Rationales, and Democracy, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635, 637 (2000). 
 174. See id. at 639. 
 175. See id. 
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condemnation to an offender and expresses it to the public.176 If 
retribution has communicative and expressive functions that are 
rooted in the localities imposing the punishment, then perhaps 
retribution justifies geographic variation after all. Indeed, there are a 
number of retributivist subtheories that similarly provide for local 
variation in sentencing practice.177 
Under the modified desert–correspondence account, variation in 
the exchange rate between offense-offender combinations and desert 
sustains comparative proportionality across localities by keeping the 
ratio of punishment to desert largely constant. Local preference is 
constitutive of desert, and capitally active localities simply treat a given 
offense–offender combination as more deserving of punishment. The 
noncorrespondence account differs in that it does not necessitate a 
constant ratio of punishment to desert. Instead, local institutional 
practice need simply be consistent with some normative or democratic 
theory that justifies movement within the negatively bounded 
retributive limit on punishment. Equally deserving offenders may in 
fact be treated differently, under certain conditions. 
Whether the role of local practice is to constitute desert (modified 
desert correspondence) or to legitimize differential treatment of equal 
desert across localities (noncorrespondence), determining whether it 
performs the hypothesized function requires scrutiny of the same 
institutions. Superficially, some of the institutions that I have discussed 
might seem well suited to these constituting and legitimizing functions. 
The problem is that the dominance of local muscle memory excludes 
the possibility that the institutions actually perform those functions. 
County-level punishment activity exhibits correlated decisionmaking 
and bureaucratic path dependence that frustrates the degree to which 
local institutions may effectively transmit a community’s punishment 
norms. Muscle memory is, in effect, the refutation of the local variation 
accounts. 
There is an objection to my retributivist position that treats my 
muscle-memory hypothesis as largely irrelevant. The argument is that 
communities express their preferences about the relationship between 
desert and punishment the same way that they express preferences 
 
 176. See Markel & Flanders, supra note 155, at 910. 
 177. See Simons, supra note 173, at 640, 657–59. For example, alternative accounts become 
necessary when dealing with international tribunals that do not speak on behalf of a dominant 
community. See Andrew K. Woods, Moral Judgments & International Crimes: The Disutility of 
Desert, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 633, 653 (2012). 
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about many matters resolved through state action: by casting votes and 
electing officials. On this view, local institutions undertake activity that 
is the expression of a community’s preferences about the form and 
content of any retributive event. A community’s retributive norms are, 
in effect, unknowable except insofar as they are expressed through 
official action. 
To argue that local capital-outcome variation reflects different 
community preferences because any official act is necessarily a 
reflection of those same preferences, however, is to collapse penal and 
democratic theory.178 A well-established retributivist tenet is that a 
punishment is not appropriate simply because the state has defined 
conduct as an offense.179 Retributivists obviously need an analytic 
device to avoid legitimizing immoral laws, such as slavery. 
Retributivism presents just punishment as something distinct from 
legal punishment.180 Similarly, local deviation may be justified by 
reference to community preference, but the measure of community 
preference is not reducible to the decisions that its elected officials or 
their appointees make.181 Whether a geographic distribution satisfies a 
retributivist constraint turns on how well the punishing institutions 
translate a community’s retributive norms, not on whether the 
punishment practice is consistent with political theory. 
If capital punishment practice is in large part local muscle 
memory, the only way that outcome concentration might evade a 
retributivist objection is to sever the retributivist commitment to 
comparative proportionality. Such severance, however, is semantic 
avoidance. Punishment within a negatively bounded sentencing range 
would still have to satisfy other features of a synthetic theory. Under 
such a theory, outcome concentration would likely run into a similar 
comparative-proportionality constraint—except one not traceable to 
retributivism so much as it is imposed pursuant to a freestanding 
equality norm.182 The norm need not flow perfectly from classic penal 
theory to be deeply embedded in the contemporary practice of 
American punishment. 
 
 178. See Simons, supra note 173, at 643, 665. 
 179. See id. at 643–46. 
 180. This distinction traces back to the most important figures in the retributivist tradition. 
For Kant, just punishment requires that punishment be both retributively and democratically 
sound. See Guyora Binder, Punishment Theory: Moral or Political?, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 321, 
350 (2002). 
 181. See Simons, supra note 173, at 643, 665. 
 182. See supra note 157, and accompanying text. 
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*   *   * 
There are plenty of regional and national institutions that are 
involved in capital punishment,183 but capital punishment is a 
substantially local phenomenon. Different localities practice the death 
penalty in very different ways, depending on the muscle memory of 
local bureaucracies and other stakeholders. The influence of such 
muscle memory on the sentencing pattern is normatively problematic 
because it signals that localities are violating the basic premise that 
equally blameworthy offenders should be treated in the same way. 
III.  DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS 
Notwithstanding the sizable normative problems that it presents, 
the local concentration of capital outcomes activates no existing 
constitutional tripwire. The Supreme Court evaluates the 
constitutionality of the death penalty through various frameworks—
either wholesale or retail (in individual cases)—that are largely 
insensitive to the geographic distribution of death sentences and 
executions. Not every normative problem has a remedy in positive law, 
so the failure to address concentration by way of federal constitutional 
rule is not in and of itself noteworthy. 
What is unique about capital-outcome concentration, however, is 
that it goes to the core concern animating the Supreme Court’s modern 
approach to the death penalty jurisprudence but to virtually none of 
the technical rules implementing it. The Court has constructed a 
baroque lattice of death penalty procedure to avoid undesirable 
patterns, but has reserved very little room under that procedure to 
consider data about the patterns themselves. 
For local variation in punishment practice to have any influence 
on the judicial administration of the death penalty, the Supreme Court 
would have to reconsider the way it conceptualizes the meaning of 
“arbitrariness,” and its relationship to other values embedded in its 
 
 183. State appellate judges are usually elected in state-wide races, as are the governors who 
consider clemency petitions. See Patrick A. Langan, Crime and Punishment in the United States, 
1981–1999, 33 CRIME & JUST. 123, 127 (2006). Federal judges who entertain habeas petitions are 
not elected at all, but are appointed by the President, with the Senate’s advice and consent. See 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Sometimes the state’s postconviction representative will report to 
the state attorney general, who is also elected in a state-wide race. See Note, Appointing State 
Attorneys General: Evaluating the Unbundled State Executive, 127 HARV. L. REV. 973, 989 (2014). 
At every stage of the process, federal law constrains outcomes, and the Supreme Court has 
appellate power over federal issues. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  
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jurisprudence. Even though Justice Breyer’s Glossip dissent invokes 
capital-outcome concentration in its discussion of the constitutionality 
of any death penalty,184 county-level concentration metrics might 
ultimately be equally or better suited for quasi-retail analysis of 
individual state death penalty regimes. To the extent that the 
constitutional law of capital punishment reflects a fundamental 
acceptance of state-to-state variation, data showing national 
concentration may be less doctrinally significant than data disclosing 
concentration—and therefore arbitrariness—within a particular state 
jurisdiction. 
In Part III, I explore the doctrinal implications of local 
concentration. I devote Part III.A to explaining why the current 
configuration of federal constitutional rules excludes consideration of 
concentrating punishment practice. In Part III.B, I consider the 
doctrinal modifications necessary to make constitutional law 
nontrivially sensitive to the phenomenon. 
A. Doctrinal Limitations 
Capital-outcome concentration describes a geographic pattern of 
death sentences and executions. Historically, pattern-based challenges 
to the death penalty have shown up in three places. First, there have 
been wholesale challenges to the death penalty’s constitutionality 
under Eighth Amendment “proportionality” jurisprudence applicable 
to all forms of punishment.185 Second, there have been retail Eighth 
Amendment challenges to individual sentences based on whether the 
sentence is consistent with the way a state typically punishes similarly 
situated offenders.186 Third, there have been retail equal protection 
challenges based on sentencing patterns that correlate with racial 
variables.187 In each context, however, the existing doctrine is almost 
completely insensitive to local concentration. 
1. Eighth Amendment: Wholesale Consideration.  Theoretically, 
capital-outcome concentration could be a salient part of the wholesale 
question of whether the Eighth Amendment permits the death penalty 
at all. The Supreme Court conducts such macroscopic inquiry under its 
 
 184. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755–56 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 185. See infra Part III.A.1.  
 186. See infra Part III.A.2.  
 187. See infra Part III.A.3.  
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Eighth Amendment “proportionality” jurisprudence.188 
Proportionality jurisprudence specifies categorical exclusions from 
punishments, based on characteristics of the offender or the offense. 
Indeed, Justice Breyer’s reference to county-level sentencing activity 
in Glossip indicates that at least he and Justice Ginsburg view such 
information as part of a proportionality analysis.189 
Proportionality jurisprudence traces most consistently to Weems 
v. United States,190 a decision establishing the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause as a rule against excessive criminal penalties: “It 
is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated 
and proportioned to offense.”191 Proportionality cases were sparse 
between 1910, when the Court decided Weems,192 and 1962, when it 
incorporated the Eighth Amendment against the states.193 
An Eighth Amendment proportionality inquiry assesses a 
sentence in light of desert’s two familiar components: offense and 
offender. The most developed proportionality rules involve either a 
sentence of death or of life without possibility of parole (LWOP). So, 
for example, certain offenses may not be capitally punished, including 
rape194 and felony murder with insufficient scienter.195 Nor may certain 
categories of offenders receive the death penalty, including minors196 
and those who are either intellectually disabled197 or insane.198 
Proportionality cases involving LWOP subdivide into similar 
categories, although the Court has ultimately declared very few 
 
 188. See generally John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899 (2011) (arguing from original meaning that 
proportionality should be understood as a retributivist constraint). 
 189. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2761 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 190. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
 191. Id. at 367.  
 192. Weems involved a sentence by a territorial court in the Philippines. See id. at 360. 
 193. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 677 (1962). 
 194. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). Coker formally announced a rule only for 
the rape of an adult woman. The Supreme Court barred the death penalty as punishment for the 
rape of a child in 2008. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008). 
 195. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982). 
 196. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
 197. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). Atkins referred to these inmates as “mentally 
retarded,” but the preferred terminology is now “intellectually disabled.” Hall v. Florida, 134 S. 
Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014). 
 198. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
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offenses off limits199 and has strongly indicated an exemption for only 
one group of offenders: juveniles.200 
Starting with Trop v. Dulles,201 the Supreme Court has measured 
proportionality by reference to the “evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society.”202 The evolving-standards 
test entails a two-step inquiry. First, the Court considers “objective 
indicia” of penal consensus, as expressed through state legislation and 
jury sentencing.203 Second, the Court considers whether, in its own 
judgment, the punishment is acceptable.204 For lack of better 
terminology, the inquiry has objective and subjective prongs—whether 
each finding is necessary or sufficient to a proportionality violation is 
not altogether clear.205 What does seem clear is that, if the Court were 
to consider the wholesale constitutionality of the death penalty under 
the existing proportionality inquiry, neither prong leaves room to 
consider the distorted geographic distribution of death sentences and 
executions. 
 
 199. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003) (rejecting proportionality challenge 
to a three-strikes sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison for felony grand theft); Harmelin 
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (rejecting proportionality challenge to mandatory LWOP 
sentence for possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 279 (1983) 
(declaring unconstitutional an LWOP sentence for the defendant’s seventh nonviolent felony); 
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 265 (1980) (rejecting proportionality challenge to application of 
Texas three-strikes law in which the defendant received a life sentence with the possibility of 
parole after twelve years). 
 200. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460, 2475 (2012). As a formal matter, Miller only 
held that mandatory LWOP sentences violated its proportionality rules. See id. at 2460. 
 201. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
 202. Id. at 101 (plurality opinion); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) 
(quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005) (same); Atkins, 536 
U.S. at 312 (same); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988) (same); Ford, 477 U.S. at 
406 (same). 
 203. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 422–34 (determining objective prong by reference to 
prevalence of and trends in state legislation, and by reference to the frequency of executions 
imposed for the crime); Roper, 543 U.S. at 567 (same); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313–17 (same); Enmund 
v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789–96 (1982) (analyzing state legislative commitment and jury 
sentencing decisions); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592–97 (1977) (plurality opinion) (looking 
to prevalence of state legislation and “sentencing decisions that juries have made”). 
 204. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421 (describing subjective inquiry as “the Court’s own 
understanding and interpretation”); Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 (“We then must determine, in the 
exercise of our own independent judgment, whether the death penalty is a disproportionate 
punishment for juveniles.”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (conducting “independent evaluation of the 
issue”); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797 (“[I]t is for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth 
Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty.”). 
 205. See Ian P. Farrell, Abandoning Objective Indicia, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 303, 306 (2013). 
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The objective portion of the existing proportionality inquiry does 
not capture capital-outcome concentration. The prevalence of state 
legislation, the trends in legislative activity, and state sentencing 
intensity are the major “objective indicia” of a punishment’s 
acceptability.206 Two of the three objective indicia are defined 
dichotomously by state legislative status, which inherently omits 
information about locally differentiated activity levels. When the 
Supreme Court considers the prevalence of death penalty legislation 
and constructs the trend line, it necessarily assigns a yes–no value to 
each state; counties do not enact sentencing statutes. 
The jury-sentencing inquiry—the third of the “objective 
indicia”—has suppressed information about intrastate variation not 
out of necessity, but in practice. When the Supreme Court considers 
sentencing intensity under its proportionality jurisprudence, it excludes 
state-level sentencing distribution. Consider the two ways the Court 
usually formulates the changes it reports in a sentencing pattern: 
(1) In the last X years, the number of comparable sentences has 
fallen to Y;207 and 
(2) In the last X years, the number of comparable sentences has 
fallen to Y across Z states.208 
In formulation (1), there is no consideration of distribution 
whatsoever. In formulation (2), there is some nod to distribution, but 
not much. There is no indication of how evenly the Y sentences are 
distributed across the Z states,209 or how evenly the sentences are 
distributed within any particular state. Perhaps more importantly, any 
analysis limited to state capital-sentencing patterns ignores one half of 
 
 206. See supra note 203 (collecting cases deciding objective-standards inquiry by reference to 
state legislative status). 
 207. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 373–74 (1989), overruled by Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (conducting jury-sentencing analysis by reference to nationwide 
data); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 832 (1988) (analyzing nationwide jury-sentencing 
data for offenders who committed a crime before they turned sixteen). 
 208. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–65 (“Since Stanford, six States have executed prisoners 
for crimes committed as juveniles. In the past 10 years, only three have done so . . . .”); Atkins, 
536 U.S. at 316 (identifying the states that have executed offenders with IQ scores below seventy). 
 209. But see Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 63–64 (2010) (noting state-by-state distribution 
and Florida’s disproportionate share of LWOP sentences for non-homicide offenses); Kennedy, 
554 U.S. at 434 (noting that Louisiana is the only state to have sentenced an offender to death for 
raping a child). 
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the penal equation: the executions.210 Unless one believes that a state 
with an enormous sentencing concentration is identical to a state with 
intuitively dispersed capital outcomes, then aggregating sentencing 
activity at the state level suppresses what seems to be important 
information about contemporary acceptance of a particular penal 
practice. 
At least theoretically, the Supreme Court could incorporate 
sentencing distribution as part of the inquiry under the proportionality 
inquiry’s subjective prong, but it has never signaled any interest in 
doing so. Nor does the distribution of sentences resemble the sort of 
content the Court considers when it performs the subjective inquiry—
which is instead more normative and less data-driven. Under the 
existing proportionality jurisprudence, capital-outcome concentration 
is likely to be irrelevant to the constitutional status of the death penalty 
writ large. 
2. Eighth Amendment: Retail Consideration.  If not writ large, then 
what about writ small? Although capital-outcome distribution is 
doctrinally insignificant under the Supreme Court’s existing wholesale 
inquiry, perhaps the distribution matters at the retail level—when 
considering the constitutionality of the death penalty in individual 
cases. Indeed, some of the rhetoric from the opinions in the July 2 
Cases—the five 1976 decisions establishing the modern constitutional 
parameters for capital punishment211—suggests that the pattern of 
death sentences might make such an Eighth Amendment difference.212 
States have to bifurcate capital trials into guilt and punishment 
phases.213 Two doctrinal priorities dominate the post-1976 Eighth 
Amendment landscape: (1) the requirement that states meaningfully 
narrow the group of first-degree murderers to a smaller subcategory of 
death-eligible offenders, and (2) the requirement that punishment-
phase juries be given the opportunity to hear and give effect to 
 
 210. But see Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 433 (noting in passing the absence of executions for rapes); 
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 (noting that the “practice [of executing intellectually disabled offenders] 
is uncommon”). 
 211. For examples of relevant cases, see sources cited supra note 20. 
 212. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 n.46 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“A system 
could have standards so vague that they would fail adequately to channel the sentencing decision 
patterns of juries with the result that a pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing like that 
found unconstitutional in Furman could occur.”). 
 213. See Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 813 (1979). 
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mitigating circumstances that might call for a life sentence.214 For ease 
of discussion, I refer to these as the “narrowing” and 
“individualization” requirements.215 Narrowing and individualization 
neatly correspond to the components of desert: offense and offender. 
Narrowing ensures that the offense is sufficiently grave, and 
individualization ensures that the offender is sufficiently culpable. 
Narrowing cannot give doctrinal form to concerns about capital-
outcome concentration. The narrowing inquiry focuses on whether 
state limits on death eligibility are sufficiently substantial and 
sufficiently clear.216 The outcome of a narrowing inquiry is generally 
insensitive to the distribution of punishment within a jurisdiction. For 
this reason, I focus more on the Supreme Court’s individualization 
jurisprudence, because it has more potential as a doctrinal vehicle for 
considering capital-outcome concentration. 
In Woodson v. North Carolina217 and Roberts v. Louisiana218—two 
of the July 2 Cases—the Supreme Court rejected mandatory capital 
sentencing.219 In subsequent decisions, it has held that states must 
permit a sentencer to give full consideration and effect to any 
mitigating evidence.220 The rules about admitting and processing 
mitigating evidence constitute the individualization requirement’s 
familiar form under the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. 
The individualized-sentencing requirement, however, looked like 
it might assume a more robust, pattern-oriented form after the July 2 
 
 214. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173–74 (2006). 
 215. Many prominent scholars use the “narrowing/individualization” nomenclature. See, e.g., 
Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Waking the Furman Giant, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 981, 1005 
(2015); James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 
1963−2006, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (2007). 
 216. See, e.g., Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361–62 (1988) (“Claims of vagueness 
directed at aggravating circumstances . . . characteristically assert that the challenged 
provision . . . leaves [juries] and appellate courts with the kind of open-ended discretion which 
was held invalid in [Furman].”); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983) (“To avoid this 
constitutional flaw, an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons 
eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence 
on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.”). 
 217. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
 218. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
 219. See id. at 332–34; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 288–301 (plurality opinion). 
 220. See Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 262–64 (2007). Until Abdul-Kabir, the 
Court had not been entirely clear as to whether the jury needed to be able to hear anything 
mitigating and to give full mitigating effect to all of the evidence. See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 
782, 797 (2001); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 476 (1993); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 
(1989), abrogated in part on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Franklin v. 
Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 183 (1988). 
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Cases. In Gregg v. Georgia221—the lead July 2 decision—the Supreme 
Court sustained a nonmandatory capital-sentencing statute that, 
among other things, required the Georgia Supreme Court to review 
every capital sentence for consistency with “similar cases,”222 to 
determine whether the penalty was “excessive or disproportionate.”223 
In other words, in ending the capital punishment moratorium, the 
Court seemed to anticipate that states would routinely review each 
capital sentence to ensure that similarly culpable offenses were being 
treated the same way.224 Such a retail inquiry is known as “comparative 
proportionality” doctrine, not to be confused with either the plain-old 
“proportionality” doctrine that governs the wholesale inquiry or with 
the concept of “comparative proportionality” from retributivist 
literature on desert. 
For a period of time after the July 2 Cases, the Court flirted with 
the comparative-proportionality doctrine.225 That inquiry focuses on 
familiar concepts from the retributivism literature: the gravity of the 
offense and culpability of the offender.226 In the language of desert, 
then, comparative proportionality seeks to ensure that equally 
deserving offenses are requited with equal punishment. To the extent 
that the major normative harm of capital-outcome concentration is that 
it violates the normative principle of comparative proportionality, the 
doctrinal concept of that same name might capture those harms quite 
well. Punishment of the undeserving would be flagged everywhere, 
including in capitally active localities. 
Even if the Supreme Court announced full-throated support of the 
comparative-proportionality rules, however, there would still be 
several reasons why it flounders as a doctrinal vehicle for considering 
capital-outcome concentration. The first involves the distortion 
associated with the procedural posture in which pattern-based 
challenges are presented. A pattern-based question is necessarily 
litigated in cases where a death verdict is obtained. The court can 
reverse the death verdict, but it cannot impose death in other cases 
 
 221. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 222. See id. at 161, 167, 198, 204–06 (plurality opinion).  
 223. Id. at 167. 
 224. States initially complied with that expectation. See Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality 
Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts After Gregg: Only “The Appearance of Justice”?, 87 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 130, 154 (1996). 
 225. See Liebman, supra note 215, at 56–57. 
 226. See supra Part II.C.  
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where there is a life sentence,227 where the defendant is acquitted of 
capital murder, where there is no capital charge, or where the offender 
is not apprehended. A court cannot guarantee that a deserving 
offender in a capitally active county is actually treated the same way as 
equally deserving offenders in capitally inactive ones—unless a state 
supreme court is prepared to “level down” punishments by invalidating 
every death sentence.228 Comparative-proportionality inquiry is 
actually an ineffective vehicle for correcting under-punishment. 
Second, because an idealized comparative proportionality 
approach would hold desert constant and compare outcomes, 
meaningful application requires an extraordinary universe of 
information. The comparison requires the court to know not just the 
offense and offender characteristics for cases triggering death 
sentences, but those inputs for all crimes generating comparable desert. 
The most judicially accessible information about desert is necessarily 
in prosecuted cases that reach advanced stages of litigation—that is, 
those where a death sentence is actually imposed. There is therefore a 
pronounced preservation bias in favor of information about offenses 
that actually trigger the death penalty, and against offenses that do not. 
Such preservation bias will systematically overemphasize the 
correspondence between desert and capital sentences because it 
suppresses the availability of information about offending that is not 
punished capitally. 
The third problem is a product of the first two. In practice and as 
explained above, a comparative-proportionality inquiry simply 
requires that a capital sentence be in the ballpark. The inquiry tends 
toward a comparison of offenders actually selected for a capital 
sentence rather than a comparison of all equally culpable offenders. To 
the extent that retail proportionality review does a better job of 
comparing the desert of criminals subject to the same punishment than 
it does comparing the punishment of criminals having the same desert, 
 
 227. I am making a general point, although it is worth noting that some states permit a trial 
court to override a jury’s life sentence in a capital case. See supra text accompanying note 102. 
 228. The concept of needing to level down subsequent penalties to achieve equality with prior 
instances of under-punishment is a particularized version of a leveling-down problem flagged in 
literature on equality. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, The Logic of Egalitarian Norms, 80 B.U. L. 
REV. 693, 696 (2000) (“Second, sometimes equality seems to demand ‘leveling down,’ to no one’s 
benefit. If the resources of two groups or classes are to be equalized, then apparently we satisfy 
equality if we take resources away from the more fortunate group, even if this does not benefit 
the less fortunate.”). 
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there is certainly no mechanism to account for the additional layer of 
geographic variation in the latter. 
Fourth, comparative-proportionality inquiry is incapable of 
capturing capital-outcome concentration because it involves only half 
of a capital-outcome pattern: the death sentence. Even though the 
geographic distribution of executions poses substantial problems for a 
retributively constrained death penalty, irregular patterns are not 
picked up by the comparative-proportionality inquiry, which involves 
death sentences and is performed by a court in the direct-review chain. 
By definition, that review happens before a state officer signs a death 
warrant, and it is therefore incapable of facilitating an apples-to-apples 
comparison involving the distribution of executions. 
Those four problems, however, are secondary to a much more 
immediate one: the Supreme Court has eliminated any ongoing 
commitment to serious comparative-proportionality inquiry. The 
Court has never been interested in conducting comparative-
proportionality inquiry itself,229 but it did briefly entertain the idea that 
it would require state appellate courts to perform that function. As 
mentioned above, Gregg was the lead July 2 Case, and it placed 
considerable emphasis on the fact that the Georgia appellate process 
would be facilitating comparative-proportionality review.230 In other 
words, one of the reasons the Court seemed to suggest for ending the 
moratorium on the death penalty was that it anticipated states would 
be reviewing each capital sentence to ensure that similar offenders 
were being treated the same way. 
The Supreme Court, however, has extinguished the idea that the 
Constitution might require even that watered-down version of 
comparative-proportionality review. In Pulley v. Harris,231 the Court 
conceded the emphasis on comparative-proportionality review in the 
July 2 Cases, but held that the emphasis did not mean that states had 
to provide for it.232 Having excluded comparative proportionality from 
the core of the July 2 regime, the Court effectively eliminated perhaps 
the most obvious mechanism for considering the effect of local 
 
 229. See Liebman, supra note 215, at 103. 
 230. See supra notes 221–24 and accompanying text. 
 231. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). 
 232. See id. at 44–45. 
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sentencing variation. After Pulley, most states abandoned 
comparative-proportionality review entirely.233 
Having allowed the comparative-proportionality experiment to 
run its course, the Supreme Court settled on a very process-oriented 
mechanism for retail inquiry; courts must simply ensure that juries hear 
and be capable of acting on mitigating evidence.234 The result is that, 
like wholesale inquiry, retail Eighth Amendment determinations are 
insensitive to capital-outcome concentration. If the Eighth 
Amendment is to be a vehicle for pattern-based challenges to the death 
penalty, then the Court will have to fundamentally transform either its 
wholesale or retail jurisprudence. 
3. Equal Protection.  The Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is theoretically capable of supporting a 
pattern-based challenge to capital punishment. To the extent that the 
capital-outcome intensity of different jurisdictions—and therefore the 
overall distribution—correlates with racial variables, then a rule rooted 
in the Equal Protection Clause could capture some of the normative 
concerns that the distribution presents. As it did with comparative-
proportionality doctrine, however, the Supreme Court has shut down 
any pattern-based attempt to prove an equal protection violation in a 
particular case.235 
The Equal Protection Clause protects persons from differentiated 
treatment,236 and the scrutiny is based on the differentiating attribute. 
If the attribute relates to race or national origin, for example, the action 
must withstand strict scrutiny.237 If it relates to sex, it must withstand 
intermediate scrutiny.238 If it relates to a “non-suspect” classification, 
then it must simply withstand rational basis review.239 The Supreme 
Court has recognized equal protection challenges to death sentences. 
A capital sentence, for example, violates Batson v. Kentucky240 if the 
prosecution uses race to determine peremptory strikes on jurors.241 
 
 233. See Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, Capital Punishment, Proportionality Review, and 
Claims of Fairness (with Lessons from Washington State), 79 WASH. L. REV. 775, 791–92 (2004). 
 234. See supra note 220. 
 235. See infra notes 242–51 and accompanying text. 
 236. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 237. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007). 
 238. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
 239. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993). 
 240. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 241. See id. at 82, 100. 
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In McCleskey v. Kemp,242 however, the Supreme Court 
categorically foreclosed the use of pattern-based evidence to prove an 
equal protection violation.243 In McCleskey, a Georgia inmate 
presented a sprawling study of the connection between race and capital 
sentencing in that state. McCleskey was a young black man from 
Fulton County, Georgia who had killed a white police officer during a 
robbery. McCleskey offered the “Baldus Study”—named after 
Professor David Baldus, the study’s lead author—as evidence of the 
equal protection violation.244 The Baldus Study used then-cutting-edge 
regression analysis to establish that killing white victims was 4.3 times 
as likely to result in a death sentence as was killing black victims, and 
that black defendants were capitally punished 1.1 times as frequently 
as white ones.245 
Justice Powell was the swing vote in McCleskey, and became 
convinced, as the litigation progressed, both that the Baldus Study was 
methodologically sound and that he did not want to go down the 
slippery slope of permitting statistical evidence alone to sustain 
litigation under the Equal Protection Clause.246 The result of Justice 
Powell’s conclusions was the controlling opinion in McCleskey, in 
which he conceded the statistical correlations presented in the Baldus 
Study, but argued that they were insufficient to prove a constitutional 
violation because “[a]pparent disparities in sentencing are an 
inevitable part of our criminal justice system.”247 
McCleskey is more than a touch controversial, with its detractors 
lumping it with anticanon decisions like Korematsu v. United States,248 
Plessy v. Ferguson,249 and Dred Scott v. Sandford.250 There is a 
 
 242. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 243. See id. at 291–99. 
 244. See id. at 286–87. 
 245. See id. at 287. 
 246. See id. at 314–19. 
 247. Id. at 312. This portion of McCleskey was actually discussing an Eighth Amendment 
violation. 
 248. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also Randall L. Kennedy, 
McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 
1389 (1988) (comparing McCleskey with Korematsu). 
 249. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see also Kennedy, supra note 248, at 1389 
(comparing McCleskey with Plessy). 
 250. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Paul Butler, By Any Means Necessary: Using 
Violence and Subversion to Change Unjust Law, 50 UCLA L. REV. 721, 733 (2003) (comparing 
McCleskey with Dred Scott). 
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mountainous literature attacking what many perceived as the casual 
acceptance of differentiated racial impact.251 Without wading into that 
literature’s thicket, suffice it to say that McCleskey eliminated the 
possibility that pattern-based evidence could be used to show an equal 
protection violation. 
The insufficiency of pattern-based evidence short-circuits the use 
of the Equal Protection Clause to litigate the consequences of capital-
outcome concentration in two ways. First, to the extent that local 
variation in capital practice correlates with race—and there are 
considerable data that it does—McCleskey eliminates a means for 
attacking that variation indirectly. Second, McCleskey also signals the 
impossibility of a direct attack on a classification based on geographic 
variables. Race is a protected status; geography is not. If a court will 
not permit pattern-based evidence to sustain a racial classification 
subject to strict scrutiny, then pattern-based evidence is useless as a 
means of challenging a geographic classification subject to rational 
basis review. 
B. Arbitrariness and Doctrinal Modification 
There is a touch of irony in the existing doctrinal status of capital-
outcome distribution. Impermissible patterns are the source of concern 
inspiring equal protection doctrine generally and modern Eighth 
Amendment restrictions on capital punishment specifically. Although 
pattern-oriented injustice might be an animating legal purpose, it is not 
part of the existing doctrinal math in death penalty cases. If the 
Supreme Court were to refine its death penalty jurisprudence in light 
of capital-outcome concentration, then what might it change? The 
answer, I submit, has to do with the way the Court defines 
“arbitrariness” and how it specifies that concept’s relationship to other 
Eighth Amendment values. A definitional revision might substantially 
 
 251. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Race and the Death Penalty Before and After 
McCleskey, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 34, 46–47 (2007); David C. Baldus, George 
Woodworth & Charles A. Pulaski, Jr., Reflections on the “Inevitability” of Racial Discrimination 
in Capital Sentencing and the “Impossibility” of Its Prevention, Detection, and Correction, 51 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359, 364–76 (1994); Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 
97 YALE L.J. 420, 443 (1988); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 
CORNELL L. REV. 1016, 1016−17 (1988). 
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affect quasi-retail inquiry into the constitutionality of death penalty 
practice within a particular state.252 
1. Defining Arbitrariness.  American death penalty decisions are 
replete with references to the evils of “arbitrariness.”253 Furman, the 
July 2 Cases, and decades of subsequent Supreme Court opinions have 
generally defined a nonarbitrary pattern as one in which there is some 
correlation between desert and capital events.254 That correlation 
negates arbitrariness, without respect to the influence of other 
variables. Equating arbitrariness only with randomness is restrictive in 
that such a definition excludes patterns that are too sensitive to 
normatively irrelevant attributes of the offense, offender, or 
proceedings. In other words, an arbitrary capital pattern might actually 
arise in two ways: (1) when a sentencing pattern is insufficiently 
sensitive to a variable that should differentiate outcomes 
(“randomness”), or (2) when it is too sensitive to a variable that should 
not (“irrelevant sensitivity”).255 The Court operates with a definition of 
arbitrariness that embraces the first attribute, but not the second; a 
refined arbitrariness rule would nudge the definition from the core to 
the frontier. 
 
 252. For example, in McCleskey, the Supreme Court noted that the statistical proof offered 
as evidence of discrimination “would extend to all capital cases in Georgia, at least where the 
victim was white and the defendant is black.” McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293. 
 253. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 341 (1992) (“[O]ur Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence . . . protect[s] against arbitrary and capricious impositions of the death sentence.”); 
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (“[I]f a State wishes to authorize capital punishment 
it [must try to avoid] the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty.”); Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“[D]iscretion must be suitably directed and 
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”); Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“There is evidence that the provision of the 
English Bill of Rights of 1689 [was aimed] to forbid arbitrary and discriminatory penalties of a 
severe nature . . . .”); id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Rather than kill an arbitrary handful 
of criminals each year, the States will confine them in prison.”). 
 254. See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 308 (“Because McCleskey’s sentence was imposed under 
Georgia sentencing procedures that focus [on offense and offender attributes], we lawfully may 
presume that McCleskey’s death sentence was not wantonly and freakishly imposed . . . .” 
(citations omitted)); Furman, 408 U.S. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“When the rate of 
infliction is at this low level, it is highly implausible that only the worst criminals or the criminals 
who commit the worst crimes are selected for this punishment.”). 
 255. This view of arbitrariness is consistent with the way some theorists have defined 
“equality.” See, e.g., Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1229 
(1997) (“By this definition, unjust treatment always occurs when a person is not treated in 
accordance with the net effect of all the relevant criteria—for instance, when an irrelevant 
criterion is used to determine that person’s treatment.”). 
KOVARSKY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2016  10:06 AM 
324  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:259 
When courts say that capital-sentencing patterns are “arbitrary” 
in the restrictive sense, they mean that the condemned are selected 
randomly from a qualified group. This type of arbitrariness was, for 
example, what troubled Justice White in his extraordinarily influential 
Furman concurrence—the idea that states capitally sentenced and 
executed death-qualified offenders too infrequently.256 The idea of 
arbitrariness as infrequency is the reason why sentencing patterns 
punctuated with only occasional executions were so often described as 
“freakish.”257 Laboring under a randomness-only definition, the 
Supreme Court has birthed a jurisprudence occupied with devices 
necessary to ensure that, ceteris paribus, more deserving offenders are 
more likely to be capitally sentenced and executed.258 
As explained above, the frontier definition of arbitrariness also 
covers irrelevant sensitivity. Irrelevant sensitivity describes a 
sentencing pattern that is not arbitrary in the sense that it is random or 
otherwise unpredictable. Instead, the pattern is influenced by variables 
that should be inconsequential insofar as they are unrelated to desert 
or some other legitimate sentencing objective.259 For example, if a 
sentencing pattern is a function of a defendant’s race or national origin 
and if arbitrary means random, then describing the pattern as 
“arbitrary” is misleading. There is nothing random about the pattern—
offenders selected for capital sentences and executions are simply 
selected on the basis of an irrelevant variable. 
For both wholesale and retail inquiries under the Eighth 
Amendment, the law’s ability to capture the normative issues 
embedded in capital-outcome concentration turns on the willingness of 
the Court to travel from the definitional core to the frontier. The 
concern that locality impermissibly influences the punishment pattern 
is fundamentally an objection rooted in irrelevant sensitivity.260 
 
 256. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring). See generally Liebman, supra note 
215, at 10 (describing modern death penalty doctrine as vacillating between the views of Justices 
Stewart and White). 
 257. See, e.g., Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990) (“Our capital punishment doctrine is 
rooted in the principle that ‘[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the 
infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to 
be . . . wantonly and . . . freakishly imposed.’” (citations omitted) (alterations in original)). An 
infrequently imposed punishment is not necessarily arbitrary, but the pattern of executions in the 
United States is not entirely explained by selectivity. See PATERNOSTER, supra note 125, at 
169−75 (explaining that infrequency of death sentencing is not due to selectivity). 
 258. See supra Part III.A.2.  
 259. See PATERNOSTER, supra note 125, at 175−82. 
 260. See id. at 175. 
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2. Arbitrariness in Wholesale Inquiry.  As of now, there is little 
room for data about capital-outcome concentration in wholesale 
inquiry. The evolving-standards-of-decency approach to Eighth 
Amendment questions centers on objective indicia of penal 
acceptance, but those indicia are merely indicators of infrequency—
not of distribution. When the Supreme Court looks at the objective 
indicia, it separates the universe into retention states and abolition 
states,261 it counts the number in each category,262 and it sometimes 
notes the direction of change.263 So as not to elevate form over function, 
it may consider how frequently the pertinent sentence is actually 
imposed, and occasionally it will mention how many states are 
responsible for those sentences.264 That information does not capture 
the degree to which punishment is concentrated in particular localities 
within states. The overarching question is whether the omitted 
information should be constitutionally significant—that is, whether 
different punishment concentration actually corresponds to different 
Eighth Amendment “standards of decency.” 
There are two reasons why it might. First, assuming that 
“consensus” is the concept that the data approximate, there is probably 
less consensus around an equally frequent punishment that is 
concentrated in fewer localities. In the most extreme conceivable 
distribution, where all sentencing activity is concentrated in a single 
locality (“perfect concentration”), it seems fair to say that punishment 
enjoys less consensus than if it were more evenly distributed across 
localities. Assuming that a consensus value falls as it approaches 
perfect concentration, the doctrinal significance of the metrics 
developed in Part I becomes clearer. To the extent that those metrics 
show that the distribution of capital punishment is moving toward the 
extreme end of the concentration spectrum, wholesale inquiry 
reporting state-wide data overstates consensus. 
 
 261. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (engaging in classification); Atkins 
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314−15 (2002) (same); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 790–91 (1982) 
(same). See generally Robert J. Smith, Bidish J. Sarma & Sophie Cull, The Way the Court Gauges 
Consensus (and How to Do It Better), 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2397, 2407–09 (2014) (discussing 
categorization and counting of retentionist and abolitionist states). 
 262. For examples of cases following categorization with counting, see supra note 261. 
 263. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315 (“It is not so much the number of these States that is 
significant, but the consistency of the direction of change.”); see also Smith et al., supra note 261, 
at 2410−11 (discussing “the Direction of Legislative Change”). 
 264. See supra notes 207–09 and accompanying text. See generally Smith et al., supra note 261, 
at 2411−14 (discussing number of sentences imposed and executions). 
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Second, one might relax the assumption that the data are 
supposed to be measuring national consensus at all, because such 
consensus may be only one facet of a standards-of-decency inquiry. 
Objective indicia measure frequency—but why? On the one hand, 
frequency might matter because it strongly indicates consensus.265 On 
the other hand, low frequency also corresponds to another punishment 
attribute: arbitrariness.266 Put differently, the Supreme Court looks to 
objective indicia of sentence frequency because low frequency suggests 
that, when the sentence is imposed, it is still being imposed arbitrarily. 
If infrequency is merely a proxy for arbitrariness, then it is perfectly 
reasonable to consider other evidence of the underlying 
phenomenon—such as the local concentration of capital punishment. 
Moreover, if the Supreme Court were unwilling to consider 
punishment concentration as an objective index of evolving decency, 
there remains room for concentration values in the subjective part of 
the doctrinal calculus. The Court, however, has been wary of having 
the subjective prong do any independent work, instead resolving it in 
whatever way reinforces the objective inquiry.267 Increasing the bite of 
the subjective prong has consequences for the Court’s credibility and 
legitimacy,268 and it would likely feel compelled to articulate a 
persuasive rationale limiting that bite to the death penalty context. 
Taking a step back, however, capital-outcome concentration 
metrics have nontrivial appeal as a means of breaking a logjam in 
wholesale Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. All sorts of public-choice 
phenomena account for the legislative status of capital punishment,269 
and sentencing data grouped by state obscure substantial information 
about how the punishment is practiced within each statewide political 
unit.270 If the Supreme Court’s preference is for objective information 
that speaks to a normatively significant phenomenon, then there is no 
reason why that universe of data need indicate only the frequency and 
state-level distribution of punishment. The Court might care about the 
local concentration of capital outcomes either because such 
information actually measures consensus or because it goes to the 
conceptually distinct question of arbitrariness. 
 
 265. See Smith et al., supra note 261, at 2411−14. 
 266. See supra notes 256–57 and accompanying text. 
 267. See Farrell, supra note 205, at 306. 
 268. See Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and 
Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L. REV. 115, 170 (2003). 
 269. See Smith et al., supra note 261, at 2419−23. 
 270. See id. at 2432. 
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3. Arbitrariness in Retail Inquiry.  The restrictive definition of 
arbitrariness also limits retail Eighth Amendment inquiry. Trial 
procedures are subject to challenge only to the extent that they tend to 
produce arbitrary sentencing patterns,271 and a sentencing pattern is 
currently designated as arbitrary only if desert does not correlate with 
death sentences.272 As with arbitrariness and wholesale inquiry, moving 
to the definitional frontier would make doctrinal room for capital-
outcome concentration. Local concentration would be particularly 
valuable information for a quasi-retail inquiry into the constitutionality 
of a state’s capital punishment system. 
For anyone critical of how retail Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence defines arbitrariness, there is a familiar culprit: 
McCleskey.273 Although most focus on McCleskey’s equal protection 
holding, it also walled the definition of Eighth Amendment 
arbitrariness inside the frontier. In much the same way that it rejected 
a correlation between outcomes and race as insufficient to prove an 
equal protection violation, McCleskey also considered that correlation 
insufficient to show Eighth Amendment arbitrariness.274 The Court 
explained that an arbitrary pattern was something other than one 
where similarly situated defendants were treated differently: “Absent 
a showing that the Georgia capital punishment system operates in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner, McCleskey cannot prove a 
constitutional violation by demonstrating that other defendants who 
may be similarly situated did not receive the death penalty.”275 The 
Court then held that, as long as capital sentences had some correlation 
with desert, a pattern could not be arbitrary: “Because . . . sentencing 
procedures . . . focus discretion ‘on the particularized nature of the 
crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual 
defendant,’ we lawfully may presume that McCleskey’s death sentence 
was not ‘wantonly and freakishly imposed’ . . . under the Eighth 
Amendment.”276 
McCleskey, however, is equal parts impediment and opportunity. 
Because the opinion took as a premise that the discretion yielding the 
sentencing pattern was uncorrelated, it leaves the Eighth Amendment 
 
 271. See supra notes 231−34 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra Part III.B.1.  
 273. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 274. See id. at 306−13. 
 275. Id. at 306−07. 
 276. Id. at 308 (citations omitted) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, at 206–07 (1976)). 
KOVARSKY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2016  10:06 AM 
328  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:259 
door to the definitional frontier cracked. A pattern of jury decisions 
was not, McCleskey explained, state “policy”; instead, it was the 
combined effect of “the decisions of hundreds of juries that are unique 
in their composition.”277 For similar reasons, McCleskey rejected a 
pattern-based argument rooted in prosecutorial discretion: “Since 
decisions whether to prosecute and what to charge necessarily are 
individualized . . . , coordination among district attorney offices across 
a State would be relatively meaningless. Thus, any inference from 
statewide statistics to a prosecutorial ‘policy’ is of doubtful 
relevance.”278 
Capital-process concentration undermines this assumption in at 
least two respects. First, the data suggest that decisions by prosecutors 
within an office and by local juries are not “individualized”; they 
actually correlate with the same underlying phenomena, and with each 
other.279 Second, the data do not show the arbitrariness of statewide 
policy, but the arbitrariness that results from localities having very 
difficult muscle memory.280 McCleskey, therefore, may not entirely 
foreclose the use of pattern-based evidence to show irrelevant 
sensitivity. 
One reason why a retail solution might be appealing to the 
Supreme Court is that the slope between capital and noncapital 
doctrine is not all that slippery. The retail rule against arbitrary 
sentencing is a rule against arbitrary capital sentencing extracted from 
Furman and the July 2 Cases. Because the rule derives from the death 
penalty-specific features of Eighth Amendment doctrine, there is less 
risk that adjusting the definition of arbitrariness under these rules 
would necessitate a similar adjustment for noncapital cases.281 
Of course, there are some challenges if the Supreme Court wants 
to operate on the definitional frontier. Recognizing irrelevant-
sensitivity challenges would require some threshold of nontriviality; 
otherwise, the nonarbitrariness rule would simply end capital 
punishment. Setting the threshold higher would permit the states that 
 
 277. Id. at 295 n.15. 
 278. Id. at 295−96, 295 n.15. (emphasis added). 
 279. See supra Part II.C.2.  
 280. The McCleskey Court was stating its assumptions under its equal protection analysis, 
even though those assumptions were logically applicable to its Eighth Amendment analysis. See 
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 295 n.15. 
 281. The Supreme Court has begun to venture gingerly into noncapital territory with its 
juvenile LWOP cases. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012) (imposing 
individualization requirement for LWOP sentences). 
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have sufficient geographic dispersion to continue to impose death 
sentences and execute offenders without disruption. In those states 
where capital outcomes are extraordinarily concentrated, by contrast, 
defendants from capitally active localities would have a stronger claim 
that their capital sentence was “arbitrary and freakish.” 
Moreover, the inquiry that would naturally result from irrelevant-
sensitivity challenges is best described as quasi-retail. If the 
problematic variable is location, there is a strong chance that desert 
correlates heavily with capital sentences in some localities and not 
others. In fact, there will almost certainly be localities where deserving 
offenders are simply not capitally punished. Recognition of an 
arbitrary pattern, then, will necessarily affect a broad category of cases. 
The result for many localities may be a leveling down of capital 
outcomes so as to conform the state jurisdiction to the desert 
parameters of the less active counties. In some state jurisdictions, 
however, the only logical result might be to discontinue capital 
sentencing and executions entirely. The unavoidability of such quasi-
wholesale effects might be one reason why the Supreme Court 
disfavored an irrelevant-sensitivity rule to begin with.282 
*   *   * 
Broadening the definition of arbitrariness to include irrelevant 
sensitivity is a doctrinal move that would obviously invite line-drawing 
problems about how much influence is too much, as well as war-of-
expert-style debates about the soundness of statistical technique. At 
the same time, the broader definition fits common intuitions about how 
death sentencing ought to work. Expected punishment should not be 
substantially affected because someone is tall, or fat, or rich, or black, 
or blonde, or gay, or wealthy—or residing in the wrong county. 
Expanding the definition of arbitrariness to include the impermissible 
influence of irrelevant variables is the key doctrinal move in creating 
space for capital-outcome concentration data in Eighth Amendment 
inquiry. 
CONCLUSION 
The data on capital outcomes disclose substantial concentration—
local pockets of sustained capital activity dotting a much larger map of 
 
 282. See supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
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abstention—both nationally and within capitally active states. There is 
no benign cause for the concentration of capital outcomes in Harris 
County, Caddo Parish, Los Angeles, or Oklahoma City. The best way 
to explain concentration is by reference to the tendency of certain 
discretionary decisions to correlate with one another. 
In light of such correlated and path-dependent decisionmaking, 
capital-outcome concentration reflects severe violations of the basic 
punishment norm that similarly blameworthy offenders be treated 
equally. Whether that normative problem ultimately represents 
something constitutionally significant may turn on the Supreme 
Court’s post-Glossip appetite for reworking its Eighth Amendment 
definition of arbitrariness. 
 
